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Abstract 
Poverty and inequality are among the most discussed topics in Economics. This thesis 
aims to investigate the empirical relationship between financial inclusion, poverty and 
gender inequality. Using unique cross-country panel and survey data sets, three 
hypotheses are tested: (1) microfinance is an effective tool for poverty reduction; (2) 
women’s participation in microfinance contributes to improvements in gender equality; 
and (3) financial inclusion has a positive effect on household income in China. The 
contributions of this thesis are fourfold. First, it shows that microfinance has a negative 
effect on poverty at the macroeconomic level. Second, it demonstrates that women’s 
participation in microfinance is associated with a reduction in gender inequality across 
countries. However, regional interactions reveal that cultural factors are likely to 
influence the gender inequality–microfinance nexus. Third, it designs a new 
multidimensional financial exclusion index using survey-level microeconomic data 
from China. The index reveals that the gender of the household head is unlikely to play 
a role in determining access to financial services. However, education, ethnicity and age 
play significant roles. Fourth, the index is also used to show that financial inclusion has 
a positive effect on household income and helps to reduce income inequality. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
The poor man … is ashamed of his poverty. He feels that it either places him out of 
the sight of mankind, or, that if they take any notice of him, they have, however, 
scarce any fellow-feeling with the misery and distress which he suffers. He is 
mortified upon both accounts, for though to be overlooked, and to be disapproved of, 
are things entirely different, yet as obscurity covers us from the daylight of honour 
and approbation, to feel that we are taken no notice of, necessarily damps the most 
agreeable hope, and disappoints the most ardent desire, of human nature. 
Adam Smith (1759) 
1.1 Background 
1.1.1 Have we done enough against poverty? 
Poverty is defined as a pronounced deprivation in wellbeing (Haughton & Khandker, 
2009, p. 1). The conventional view primarily links wellbeing to a command over 
commodities, so that the poor are those who do not have enough income or 
consumption to place them above an adequate minimum threshold. This view sees 
poverty largely in monetary terms (Haughton & Khandker, 2009). Poverty also has 
causal links to many other forms of deprivation in wellbeing. Poor people often lack key 
capabilities. They may have inadequate access to health care and housing, as well as 
educational services and employment opportunities, or lack political freedoms (Gordon 
& Spicker, 1999; Haughton & Khandker, 2009). Measuring these variables and 
unravelling their complex connections is challenging because their effects on people’s 
lives can be devastating. 
In the last 200 years, the world has seen a marked decline in absolute poverty (Sala-i-
Martin & Pinkovskiy, 2010).1 This fall can be attributed to two developing giants—
India and China—which were responsible for approximately three-quarters of the 
reduction in the world’s poor over a 10-year period to 2015 (Chandy & Gertz, 2011). In 
India, more than 360 million people have escaped poverty—a number equal to that of 
                                                 
1 According to the World Bank, absolute poverty—or extreme poverty—widely refers to earning below 
the international poverty line of US$1.25 (or $2) per day (in 2005 prices). In October 2015, this definition 
was revised to living on less than US$1.90 (or $3.10) per day, reflecting the latest updates in purchasing 
power parities (in 2011 prices). 
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all other countries combined (Chandy & Gertz, 2011). Despite its rising income 
inequality, China has been growing at an unprecedented rate. Extreme poverty is 
disappearing, with more than 800 million people escaping absolute poverty between 
1980 and 2015.2 According to the most recent estimates from the World Bank, China’s 
extreme poverty rate fell from 66.6 per cent in 1990 to 1.9 per cent in 2013.3 
Nevertheless, even in India, poverty rates remain relatively high (e.g., in 2011, India’s 
extreme poverty rate was 21.2 per cent, or 268 million people), and poverty remains a 
pressing challenge in many other parts of the world. Using an updated international 
poverty line of US$1.90 per day, the World Bank reported that global poverty declined 
from 1.85 billion people (35 per cent of the global population) in 1990 to 767 million 
people (10.7 per cent of the global population) in 2013. Of these 767 million people, 
half live in the Sub-Saharan Africa region. The number of poor in this region declined 
by only four million, with 389 million people living in extreme poverty in 2013—more 
than all other regions combined. 4  Therefore, poverty has declined, but it has not 
fundamentally changed, especially for most of the poorest countries. 
 
Figure 1.1: Poverty in China and India 
Notes: The poverty headcount ratio is at US$1.90 a day (2011 purchasing power parity [PPP]). As a result 
of data unavailability, India has very few observations. 
Source: World Development Indicators from the World Bank 
                                                 
2 http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/china/overview#1. 
3 http://povertydata.worldbank.org/poverty/country/CHN. 
4 http://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/poverty/overview#1. 
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Figure 1.2: Poverty around the world (2013) 
Source: World Bank 
1.1.2 Gender and poverty: are women poorer than men? 
In the literature on poverty, one question that is frequently asked is: Are women poorer 
than men? In these discussions, the concept of the feminisation of poverty, which was 
introduced by Pearce (1978), is used to summarise a variety of ideas. Pearce (1978) 
found that women account for ‘an increasingly large proportion of the economically 
disadvantaged’ (p. 128). Basically, the feminisation of poverty can mean one or a 
combination of the following: (1) in contrast with men, women have a higher incidence 
of poverty; (2) over time, the incidence of poverty among women will increase 
compared with men; and (3) women’s poverty is more severe than men’s (Cagatay, 
1998). 
Scholars have conducted ongoing investigations into the feminisation of poverty, 
finding that factors such as parenthood, education and employment are the main 
contributors to female poverty. For example, using census data from the United States 
(US), Starrels, Bould and Nicholas (1994) examined the contributions of gender, race, 
ethnicity, marital status, parenthood and employment to the feminisation of poverty. 
They found that while these variables all strongly affect poverty rates, race and gender 
are the most two important variables. In particular, parenthood interacts with gender in 
such a way that it only affects women. This is an institutive finding because women 
have unpaid responsibilities for childcare and other family labour, which potentially 
40.99
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limits the range of paid economic activities they can undertake, thus resulting in 
involuntary poverty. Using data from eight developed countries, McLanahan, Garfinkel 
and Casper (1994) reached similar conclusions. They found that parenthood (including 
single parenthood), marital status and employment are the most important factors 
contributing to the gender–poverty gap not only in the US, but in all countries. In a 
more recent study, Wilson (2012) focused on one significant factor—employment—and 
found that lower wages resulting from occupational segregation, discrimination and 
insufficient work hours are the main drivers of poverty among women. 
Scholars have been unable to determine whether the feminisation of poverty is a 
universal phenomenon (i.e., whether women are universally poorer than men). There are 
mainly two reasons. First, gender-disaggregated poverty—data are not produced 
regularly by countries around the world, so there are no systemically compiled data at 
the global level. Second, no single straightforward measure from a gender perspective 
and no alternative internationally agreed-upon indicator that can give more meaningful 
poverty estimates for males and females (United Nations Department of Economic and 
Social Affairs, 2015). In the absence of these data, scholars have conducted many 
comparative studies between male- and female-headed households (FHHs) to examine 
whether poverty is taking on a female face. The idea is that if the incidence of income 
or consumption poverty of FHHs is lower than that of male-headed households, the 
concern is valid. For example, using data from 10 developing countries, Quisumbing, 
Haddad and Peña (1995) found weak evidence that the poor are dominated by FHHs. 
There are only a few differences between male-headed households and FHHs among 
the poor. Similar to Quisumbing et al. (1995), Moghadam (2005) found inconclusive 
evidence that supports the assertion that FHHs are among the poorest of the poor across 
the world. According to Moghadam (2005), the relationship between FHHs and poverty 
is the strongest in the US, but there is some variation in other countries. 
In summary, the assertion that women are universally poorer than men cannot be 
substantiated, but it is an undeniable truth that women are disadvantaged. As 
Moghadam (2005, p. 1) stated: 
If poverty is to be seen as a denial of human rights, it should be recognized that the 
women among the poor suffer doubly from the denial of their right—first on account 
of gender inequality, second on account of poverty. 
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1.1.3 Role of financial inclusion—particularly microfinance—in reducing poverty 
and gender inequality 
Over the past few decades, in both developing and developed countries, policymakers 
and regulators have been undertaking initiatives to prioritise financial inclusion in 
financial sector development. These policies include legislative measures (e.g., 
‘Financial Inclusion Task Force’, 2005, of the United Kingdom [UK]), banking sector 
initiatives (e.g., ‘Mzansi’ account of South Africa) and other alternative financial 
institutions (e.g., microfinance). At the global level, the World Bank declared its 
strategic plan of achieving universal financial access by 2020, given that an estimated 
two billion adults worldwide (i.e., 38 per cent) do not have a basic bank account 
(Demirgüç-Kunt, Klapper, Singer, & Van Oudheusden, 2015). Among these initiatives, 
microfinance (also referred to as microfinance institutions [MFIs] or microfinance 
programmes) has received considerable attention. There are two main reasons why this 
is the case. First, it has been proven to be an efficient tool in promoting financial 
inclusion (Dev, 2006). Compared with government and industry initiatives, 
microfinance is good at providing tailored financial services to unbanked people. For 
example, most banks would not extend loans to those with few or no assets; however, 
microfinance believes that even a small amount of credit can help create job 
opportunities and generate income. 
Second, microfinance has been growing rapidly across the developing world. According 
to the Microcredit Summit Campaign, which is an industry representative, the Asia–
Pacific region had 144.17 million clients of MFIs in 2013. This is around 18 times that 
of Sub-Saharan Africa, 35 times that of Latin America and the Caribbean, and 577 
times that of Eastern Europe and Central Asia. Almost 96.8 million people, or 66.92 per 
cent of microfinance clients, can be classified as poor, according to the international 
definition of the term.5 It must be highlighted that the motivation behind this movement 
was poverty alleviation. Since the start, microfinance has aimed for this by widening the 
poor’s access to financial services. For example, with more access to credit, poor 
households can start a small business, such as growing vegetables or raising piglets, 
which could help the family generate income and improve health. It is this potential, 
                                                 
5 https://stateofthecampaign.org/2013-data/ 
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more than anything else, that accounts for the flourishing of microfinance on the global 
stage (Brau & Woller, 2004). 
At the same time, the fact that most of the poorest clients of MFIs are women places 
microfinance in a position in which it might not only reduce poverty, but also improve 
gender equality. According to a Microcredit Summit Campaign report published in 
2015, 3,098 MFIs reached more than 211 million clients in 2013—114 million of whom 
were living in extreme poverty. Of these poorest clients, 82.6 per cent (more than 94 
million) were women.6 It is argued that giving women access to credit would strengthen 
their decision-making power within the household, and they are more likely than men to 
spend resources in ways that benefit the whole household (Armendáriz & Morduch, 
2010; Khandker, 2005; Pitt, Khandker, & Cartwright, 2006). Thus, by empowering 
women, microfinance can make a significant contribution to gender equality. 
1.2 Research aims and objectives 
The central objective of this thesis is to investigate the relationship between financial 
inclusion, poverty and inequality. As a proven effective tool in promoting financial 
inclusion (Dev, 2006), microfinance aims for poverty reduction; therefore, the first 
research question is: 
1. Does microfinance reduce poverty? 
As microfinance also aims to reduce gender inequality by targeting women (Cheston & 
Kuhn, 2002), the second research question is: 
2. Does microfinance reduce gender inequality? 
As Hermes (2014) noted, given the unavailability of reliable data on microfinance, very 
few recent studies have investigated the effect of microfinance on poverty and gender 
inequality at the macroeconomic level. Thus, investigating these two questions at the 
cross-country level will complement the existing literature. 
Conversely, although financial inclusion has gained popularity around the world, only a 
limited number of studies have investigated whether financial inclusion has helped to 
                                                 
6 https://stateofthecampaign.org/data-reported/ 
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improve people’s lives. One reason for this is that there is no available index measuring 
financial inclusion at the microeconomic level. Therefore, the third research question is: 
3. Can we develop an index to measure financial inclusion at the microeconomic 
level? 
With such an index, and considering the fact that household income is the most 
important determinant of poverty, this thesis then asks the final research question: 
4. Does financial inclusion increase household income? 
1.3 Methodology 
This thesis adopts a quantitative approach. Chapters 2–5 identify unanswered research 
questions by examining the current literature surrounding financial inclusion, 
microfinance, poverty and inequality. After conducting an extensive literature review, 
this thesis sets out to investigate the four research questions identified in the previous 
section. It then sets up three hypotheses corresponding to the research questions: 
Hypothesis 1: Microfinance does not reduce poverty. 
Hypothesis 2: Microfinance does not reduce gender inequality. 
Hypothesis 3: Financial inclusion does not have a positive effect on household 
income. 
Next, this thesis makes predications of outcomes concerning these hypotheses. It is 
expected that microfinance will be found to reduce poverty and gender inequality, and 
that financial inclusion will be found to have a positive effect on household income. 
This thesis then collects data from various sources and uses a number of advanced 
econometric techniques to investigate the four research questions. Specifically, in 
Chapters 2 and 3, panel data techniques such as fixed-effects analysis and the Heckman 
two-step method are applied, and in Chapters 3 and 4, techniques such as quantile 
regression (QR) and propensity score matching (PSM) are employed. In Chapters 2–5, 
this thesis employs alternative techniques to conduct robust tests. 
  8 
1.4 Thesis structure 
To answer the four research questions, Chapters 2–5 each examine one question. 
Specifically, Chapter 2 investigates whether microfinance contributes to poverty 
reduction at the macroeconomic level. Given that microfinance targets women, 
Chapter 3 examines whether women’s participation in microfinance contributes to 
improvements in gender equality. Chapter 4 constructs the Multidimensional Financial 
Exclusion Index (MFEI) to explore the main factors affecting household financial 
inclusion status. Using the MFEI, Chapter 5 investigates the effect of financial inclusion 
on household income. Finally, Chapter 6 makes some concluding remarks about the 
main findings and the contributions of this thesis, and it discusses policy implications 
stemming from the outcomes of the study. 
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Chapter 2: Does Microfinance Reduce Poverty?7 
Sustainable Development Goal 1: 
End poverty in all its forms everywhere. 
United Nations 
This chapter uses a unique cross-country panel data set from 106 countries for the 
period 1998–2013 to examine the hypothesis that microfinance is an effective tool for 
reducing poverty at the macroeconomic level. Taking into account the potential problem 
of sample selection bias and endogeneity, this chapter shows that microfinance has a 
negative effect on poverty. The results are robust to the choice of microfinance 
measures and poverty indicators, suggesting that national governments and international 
development agencies should continue to promote microfinance as a tool for reducing 
poverty in developing and emerging countries. 
The rest of this chapter is organised as follows. Section 2.1 introduces the topic of this 
chapter, and Section 2.2 presents the literature review. Section 2.3 describes the 
methodology and model, and Section 2.4 presents the data used. Section 2.5 presents the 
empirical results, and Section 2.6 concludes. 
2.1 Introduction 
Does microfinance, which is an effective tool in promoting financial inclusion (Dev, 
2006), really help poor people in developing and emerging countries? This is a 
fundamental question in the debate on the effect of microfinance with respect to 
reducing poverty. In a wide range of disciplines, poverty is a widely discussed topic, 
and opinions regarding its explanations and solutions vary between disciplines. For 
example, demographers deem gender and family structure to be key determinants of 
poverty, while historians ascribe poverty to historical factors such as triangular trade 
and colonisation, and geographers consider the geographical location of each economy 
the key determinant of poverty (Zhuang et al., 2009). 
                                                 
7 Part of Chapter 2 has previously been published: Zhang, Q. (2017). Does microfinance reduce poverty? 
Some international evidence. BE Journal of Macroeconomics, 17(2). 
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Most economists agree that location, historical and cultural factors are important, as is 
macroeconomic policy. For example, economic growth has been found to be essential in 
reducing poverty, both theoretically and empirically (Dollar & Kraay, 2002; Durlauf, 
Johnson, & Temple, 2005). Empirical evidence has shown that other factors have a 
positive effect on reducing poverty, including democracy (Acemoglu & Robinson, 
2000; Savoia, Easaw, & McKay, 2010), the accumulation of human capital (Gregorio & 
Lee, 2002; Jung & Thorbecke, 2003; Kappel, 2010), arable land (Tesfamicael, 2005) 
and income inequality (Besley & Burgess, 2003; Hermes, 2014; Soubbotina & Sheram, 
2000). However, scholars have argued about the effects of some other factors. For 
instance, while some have found that more trade is associated with a decline in poverty 
(Dollar & Kraay, 2004; Maertens & Swinnen, 2009), others have found that trade 
openness can increase poverty (Topalova, 2007; Wade, 2004). Similarly, some scholars 
have found that financial development disproportionately helps the poor (Beck, 
Demirgüç-Kunt, & Levine, 2007; Clarke, Xu, & Zou, 2006), while others believe that, 
to some degree, financial development may increase poverty and inequality (Behrman, 
Birdsall, & Székely, 2001; Jalilian & Kirkpatrick, 2005). 
Among these factors, income inequality has received considerable critical attention. 
Through its effect on economic performance, income distribution directly affects the 
level of poverty. Mohammed (2017) stated that in both developed and developing 
countries, the poorest half of the population often controls less than 10 per cent of the 
country’s wealth. High income inequality reduces the sustainability of economic 
growth, weakens social cohesion and security, encourages inequitable access to, and use 
of, global commons, and cripples hope for sustainable development and peaceful 
societies (Mohammed, 2017). The broadening income gap in both developed and 
developing countries is a key challenge in our time. Unsurprisingly, the 2014 Pew 
Global Attitudes Survey showed that in the seven Sub-Saharan African nations polled, 
more than 90 per cent of respondents regarded the gap between rich and poor as a large 
problem.8 
A factor that has received considerably less attention in the poverty literature is 
microfinance (also referred to as MFIs or microfinance programmes). Over the past few 
decades, various forms of microfinance programmes have been introduced in many 
8 https://widgets.weforum.org/outlook15/01.html 
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countries, primarily aiming to alleviate poverty and reduce inequality by increasing the 
poor’s access to financial services. According to the Microcredit Summit Campaign, 
which is an industry representative, there were 144.17 million clients of MFIs in the 
Asia–Pacific region in 2013. This is almost 18 times that of Sub-Saharan Africa, 35 
times that of Latin America and the Caribbean, and 577 times that of Eastern Europe 
and Central Asia. Almost 96.8 million people, or 66.92 per cent of microfinance clients, 
can be classified as poor, according to the international definition of the term. 
Microfinance provides the potential to alleviate poverty while paying for itself and, 
perhaps, even turning a profit. It is this potential that accounts for the flourishing of 
microfinance around the world (Brau & Woller, 2004). A few studies have found that 
microfinance has a positive effect on households’ economic and social welfare, while 
contributing to poverty reduction (Zhuang et al., 2009). These studies are mainly 
country-specific or area-specific case studies that primarily rely on micro-level 
evidence. The aim of this chapter is to contribute to the literature by examining the 
effects of microfinance on poverty at the macroeconomic level. 
2.2 Literature review 
As mentioned previously, interest in this relationship has led to a growing number of 
empirical studies. The first group focuses on how financial development helps to reduce 
poverty or income inequality, while the second group examines a specific driver of 
financial development—namely, microfinance. 
2.2.1 Financial development, poverty and income inequality 
A considerable number of empirical studies have suggested that poverty and income 
inequality can be reduced through financial development (Bahmani-Oskooee & Zhang, 
2015; Clarke, Zou, & Xu, 2003; Hamori & Hashiguchi, 2012; Jeanneney & Kpodar, 
2011; Kappel, 2010; Li, Squire, & Zou, 1998). Cross-country evidence indicates that the 
poverty and income inequality reduction effects of financial development are well 
established, and by now widely accepted, although there are some methodological 
issues associated with cross-country studies (Zhuang et al., 2009), such as heterogeneity 
of effects across countries and missing relevant explanatory variables. Using 
unbalanced panel data comprising 126 countries, Hamori and Hashiguchi (2012) 
showed that financial development reduces inequality, and that this effect is robust to 
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the choice of financial variables, income measures and model specifications. Jeanneney 
and Kpodar (2011) examined how financial development contributes to reducing 
poverty, both directly (through the distributional effect) and indirectly (through 
economic growth). They found that financial development is pro-poor, with the direct 
effect stronger than the effect through economic growth. According to their findings, 
the poor benefit much more from financial development, although to some degree, they 
fail to take full advantage of the availability of credit. Further, they may suffer from 
increasing financial instability accompanied by financial development. Overall, the 
benefits outweigh the costs. 
A group of earlier studies suggested that there is an inverted U-curve between financial 
development and income inequality, which is known as the Greenwood–Jovanovic (G–
J) hypothesis (Greenwood & Jovanovic, 1990). The G–J hypothesis posits that financial 
development may widen inequality and increase poverty in the early stages of 
development and reduce them as average incomes increase. This was further developed 
and supported by theoretical studies such as Aghion and Bolton (1997) and Matsuyama 
(2000). In contrast, some empirical studies have supported the G–J hypothesis (Jalilian 
& Kirkpatrick, 2005; Kim & Lin, 2011; Tan & Law, 2012). For instance, Jalilian and 
Kirkpatrick (2005) examined the nexus between financial development, economic 
growth, inequality and poverty reduction. According to their results, financial 
development contributes to alleviating poverty through growth-enhancing effects when 
economic development reaches a certain threshold level. Using a data set from China 
for the period 1978–2013, Zhang and Chen (2015) argued that there is an inverted U-
shaped relationship between financial development and income inequality. Their results 
are valid for two indicators: the scale and the efficiency of financial development. There 
are many channels through which financial development serves to promote growth, 
alleviate poverty and reduce income inequality. The basic function of finance, which is 
the provision of saving services, allows the poor to accumulate funds securely for their 
future investment and expenditure. It offers them a fixed return on their saving, 
although this is not very high. Similarly, insurance can protect the poor against some 
unanticipated disasters and shocks. These services can ‘reduce the vulnerability of the 
poor, and minimize the negative impacts that shocks can sometimes have on long-run 
income prospects’ (Department for International Development, 2004, p. 11). 
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However, the most important way in which financial development can reduce poverty 
and income inequality is through access to financial services. Several empirical studies 
have demonstrated that a lack of access to ongoing financial services is a serious 
problem—especially in developing countries—in relation to combatting poverty and 
income inequality (Beck & Demirgüç-Kunt, 2008; Hulme & Mosley, 1996; McKenzie 
& Woodruff, 2008). As stated by Li et al. (1998), inequality is relatively stable within 
countries, but it varies across countries. Differences across countries can largely be 
explained by capital market imperfections. As a result of adverse selection, asymmetric 
information and moral hazard risks in the financial market, credit constraints are 
widespread among developing countries (Aghion & Bolton, 1997; Banerjee & 
Newman, 1993; Galor & Zeira, 1993). Credit constraints particularly affect the poor 
because they have neither the resources to fund their own projects, nor the collateral to 
access bank credit (Zhuang et al., 2009). These constraints prevent the poor from using 
existing and potential investment opportunities, while financial development helps 
remove them and reduce transaction costs. Therefore, financial development broadens 
access to ongoing financial services for the poor, which not only enable them to invest 
in human capital (e.g., education and health), but also make it possible for them to start 
small businesses and manage investments. 
As argued by Li et al. (1998), most people in developing countries do not have access to 
ongoing financial services because of underdeveloped financial systems. In developed 
countries, this can be overcome using collateral and credit-scoring systems, but these 
are not applicable in developing countries. Many potential borrowers cannot offer 
collateral, and they are unlikely to have a credit record (Zhuang et al., 2009). Hence, in 
developing countries, informal financial sectors, including microfinance, can help with 
this problem. 
2.2.2 Microfinance, poverty and income inequality 
As discussed earlier, the second group of studies examines the role of microfinance in 
reducing poverty and income inequality. Most of these studies are country- or region-
specific and are based on micro-level research, but it is difficult to generalise their 
conclusions because they use different methods and measurements. 
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For example, Ghalib, Malki and Imai (2015) examined whether household access to 
microfinance reduces poverty in Pakistan. After interviewing 1,132 borrower and non-
borrower households from 2008 to 2009, they found that microfinance programmes had 
a positive effect on participating households. Using a four-round panel survey in 
Bangladesh over the period 1997–2004, Imai and Azam (2012) noted that the overall 
effects of MFI loans on income and food consumption were positive, which supported 
the poverty-reducing effects of microfinance in Bangladesh. Many other scholars have 
obtained similar findings about Bangladesh (Chemin, 2008; Chowdhury, Ghosh, & 
Wright, 2005; Khandker, 1998; Nawaz, 2010). The positive role of microfinance in 
reducing poverty has also been identified in Bolivia (Navajas, Schreiner, Meyer, 
Gonzalez-Vega, & Rodriguez-Meza, 2000), India (Imai, Arun, & Annim, 2010), 
Nigeria (Okpara, 2010), Sri Lanka (Shaw, 2004), Central America (Hiatt & 
Woodworth, 2006) and Africa (Mosley & Rock, 2004). 
Other studies have shown a different perspective on this issue. Van Rooyen, Stewart 
and De Wet (2012) studied the effects of microcredit and micro-savings on poor people 
in Sub-Saharan Africa. They found that microfinance can, in some cases, increase 
poverty, reduce levels of education and disempower women. Weiss and Montgomery 
(2005) surveyed the evidence from Asia and Latin America and found limited evidence 
that microfinance is reaching the core poor population in either region. Chowdhury 
(2009) critically appraised the debate on the effectiveness of microfinance as a universal 
poverty-reduction tool and concluded that the effect of microfinance on reducing 
poverty remains in doubt. According to Chowdhury (2009), public policy should focus 
on growth-oriented and equity-enhancing programmes such as broad-based productive 
employment creation. Littlefield, Morduch and Hashemi (2003) also shared this view, 
pointing out that no single intervention, including microfinance, can defeat poverty. 
Microfinance forms a base upon which many other essential interventions depend, such 
as health care, education and nutritional advice. Improvements in these interventions 
can be sustained only when households have an increased income and greater control 
over financial resources. In this way, microfinance reduces poverty and its effects in 
multiple, concrete ways (Littlefield et al., 2003). 
As a result of the unavailability of reliable macro-level data on microfinance, very few 
recent studies have investigated the effect of microfinance on poverty and income 
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inequality at the macro level. For example, using a data set of 61 developing countries 
between 2005 and 2007, Hisako and Shigeyuki (2009) conducted detailed empirical 
cross-country analysis of the effect of microfinance on inequality. They measured the 
degree of microfinance intensity in two ways: the number of MFIs and the number of 
borrowers in a country. They showed that microfinance can lower income inequality, 
which suggests that it can be an effective tool for redistribution. Hisako and Shigeyuki 
(2009) also showed that poorer countries need to focus on the equalising effects of 
microfinance. However, their work did not correct for the problem of endogeneity, and 
they did not control for omitted time-invariant country characteristics using fixed 
effects. Taking into account the possibility of endogeneity, Imai, Gaiha, Thapa and 
Annim (2012) conducted research based on a cross-country and panel data set of 48 
countries between 2003 and 2007. They applied ordinary least squares (OLS) and 
instrumental variable (IV) techniques to estimate the effect of microfinance on poverty. 
Their results suggested that microfinance significantly reduces poverty at the macro 
level; therefore, it supports the practice of directing funds from development financial 
institutions and the government to MFIs in developing countries. Compared with 
Hisako and Shigeyuki (2009), Imai et al. (2012) largely relied on gross loan portfolios 
to measure microfinance activities in a country. 
Following Imai et al. (2012) and Hisako and Shigeyuki (2009), Hermes (2014) explored 
microfinance activities based on a cross-sectional data set and focused on the effects of 
microfinance on income inequality. Two measures were used to capture microfinance 
intensity: the number of active borrowers and the total value of the microfinance loans 
issued. The IV estimation technique was used to account for the endogeneity problem. 
According to Hermes (2014), high levels of microfinance participation are associated 
with a reduction in income inequality, while the effects of microfinance on reducing 
income inequality appear to be relatively small. Consequently, Hermes (2014) argued 
that microfinance should not be regarded as a panacea for significantly reducing income 
inequality. 
The present chapter examines the effect of microfinance on poverty at the macro level 
using a unique cross-country panel data set of 106 countries for the period 1998–2013. 
The macroeconomic approach based on cross-country data is chosen because the results 
will provide an overall picture of the relationship between microfinance and poverty in 
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developing and emerging countries. This chapter makes a number of contributions to 
the existing literature. First, it uses a unique panel data set covering 106 countries for 
the period 1998–2013 from two large-scale data collection projects: the Microcredit 
Summit Campaign 9  and the Microfinance Information Exchange (MIX) Market. 10 
Second, it measures microfinance in both depth (measured by the aggregate number of 
clients and the aggregate number of poorest clients) and size (measured by gross loan 
portfolio). Third, it addresses two potential endogeneity problems—namely, sample 
selection bias and reverse causality—using the combined Heckman two-step method.11 
2.3 Methodology and model 
The methodology of this chapter follows previous studies that have examined the 
relationship between financial development and poverty (Clarke et al., 2006; Li et al., 
1998). These studies measured the size and/or depth of the financial sector using formal 
financial sector measures to represent financial development. This chapter adopts a 
similar approach, but it replaces formal sector measures with measures of the size and 
depth of microfinance. This chapter also follows other recent empirical studies to 
inform its model (Hermes, 2014; Hisako & Shigeyuki, 2009; Imai et al., 2012). The 
empirical specification is given as: 
 𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽𝑀𝑖𝑡 + 𝛾𝑋𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼𝑖 + 𝜆𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 (2.1) 
where 𝑦𝑖𝑡 is a vector of dependent variables, which refers to the poverty indicators for 
country 𝑖 at time 𝑡, and 𝑀𝑖𝑡  is a vector of microfinance variables, which is the main 
focus of this chapter. The vector, 𝑋𝑖𝑡, contains control variables, while 𝛼𝑖 is a country 
dummy, 𝜆𝑡  is a time dummy (year fixed effects) that is used to control for omitted 
shocks that every country suffers (e.g., the Global Financial Crisis) and 𝜀𝑖𝑡 is a normally 
distributed mean-zero error term. 
                                                 
9 http://www.microcreditsummit.org 
10 http://www.mixmarket.org 
11 Hisako and Shigeyuki (2009) did not consider the possibility of endogeneity and did not control for 
fixed effects in their study. As a result of data availability, Imai et al.’s (2012) analysis is based on data 
from only 48 countries for 2007 (for cross-sectional estimations) and 2003 and 2007 (for panel data 
estimations). To address the potential endogeneity problems, they used two types of instrument: cost of 
enforcing contract and weighted five-year lag of average gross loan portfolios. Based on a five-year 
average cross-sectional data set using 70 countries, Hermes (2014) also used IV estimation to address 
possible endogeneity problems. Compared with Imai et al. (2012), two additional instruments have been 
used: the country’s legal origin and the absolute value of the country’s capital city latitude. 
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There are potentially two endogeneity problems to be addressed in this model. The first 
is sample selection bias. In many surveys, non-randomly missing data may occur 
because of a variety of self-selection rules. According to Baltagi (2008), if the selection 
rule is ignorable for the parameters of interest, one can use standard panel data methods 
for consistent estimation. However, if the selection rule is non-ignorable, then one must 
take into account the mechanism that causes the missing observations to obtain the 
consistent estimates of the parameters of interest. In the model used in this study, the 
dependent variable—poverty estimates—is only available for two or three specific years 
for most countries because the construction of international poverty estimates relies on 
nationwide household expenditure or income surveys (Imai et al., 2012). As a result of 
limited resources and a large population, most developing countries only collect data 
once or twice per decade. Thus, it is improper to apply a standard panel data method. 
The second problem is reverse causality, which usually results in inconsistent parameter 
estimates. In this study, the microfinance variables are likely to be endogenous in the 
poverty equation. Reverse causality from poverty to microfinance indicators may arise, 
suggesting that microfinance development is driven by poverty reduction. 
To control for both sample selection bias and reverse causality, this chapter employs a 
model developed by Mroz (1987). The model (also called the combined Heckman two-
step correction) consists of two stages. Stage one corrects for selection bias by 
estimating a probit model with the dependent variable, taking the value of 1 if the 
country has poverty data in a given year. Stage two uses instrumental variables to 
control for reverse causality (Wooldridge, 2010). The purpose of stage one is to 
eliminate the problem of sample selection bias, which is usually done by modelling the 
selection mechanisms explicitly and adjusting the estimation of the parameters in the 
regression equation for the selection effect (Heckman, 1976, 1977). This is obtained by 
including the inverse Mills ratio (IMR) in the structural equation. The IMR is calculated 
from the first stage and reflects how the variables included in this stage are related to 
the selection of the sample. 
When estimating Equation (2.1), a specific selection problem occurs—namely, that of a 
truncated sample—because poverty estimates are only available for two or three 
specific years for most countries. Consequently, the sample is not random, and the 
relationship between poverty and microfinance is not estimated correctly. Thus, in stage 
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one, this chapter uses a probit estimation to estimate the probability of being in the 
selected sample. Two variables—gross domestic product (GDP) per capita and total 
population—are chosen as the selection criteria based on two considerations. First, 
countries with low GDP per capita are poor; thus, they have limited resources to 
conduct surveys. Second, it is assumed that it is more difficult to collect household data 
in very populous economies. 
In stage two, the structural equation is estimated. Given the difficulty in finding a sound 
instrument that correlates with microfinance variables but does not have a direct causal 
effect on poverty, this chapter uses the lagged value of the endogenous variables (here, 
three microfinance variables). This technique is based on the idea that the past value of 
independent variables will affect the present value of dependent variables. Finally, the 
dependent variable of interest—in this case, two types of poverty measurements—is 
regressed on the lagged microfinance variables, the IMR and a number of control 
variables. In doing so, this chapter controls for both sample selection bias and 
endogeneity at the same time. 
2.4 Data 
The cross-country panel data set used in this chapter covers 106 countries between 1998 
and 2013. These countries were chosen based on the availability of data. Appendix 
provides a list of all countries included in the sample, with the number of poverty 
observations from each country given in parentheses. 
The choice of an appropriate measure of poverty is never straightforward. Although 
poverty is usually defined as having insufficient resources or income, in its extreme 
form, it is a lack of basic human needs, such as adequate food, clothing, housing, clean 
water and health services. Poverty is also a lack of education and opportunity, and it 
may be connected to insecurity and fear about the future, or lack of representation and 
freedom (Huang & Singh, 2011). However, much of the existing literature focuses on 
the economic aspects of poverty, using either the poverty headcount ratio or the poverty 
gap. This chapter adopts a similar approach by using two types of indicators from the 
World Bank: the poverty headcount ratio and the poverty gap. The poverty headcount 
ratio measures the percentage of the population living below the poverty line. The 
poverty gap assesses the mean shortfall from the poverty line, expressed as a percentage 
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of the poverty line. These indicators are widely used, and purchasing power parity 
(PPP) makes it straightforward to compare them across countries.12 
The data on microfinance are obtained from two large-scale data collection projects: the 
Microcredit Summit Campaign and the MIX Market. The Campaign is a high-profile 
advocacy network of institutions and individuals involved in microfinance. From 1997 
to 2016, it brought together microfinance practitioners, advocates, educational 
institutions, donor agencies, international financial institutions, non-governmental 
organisations and others involved with microfinance to promote best practices in the 
field, stimulate the interchanging of knowledge and work towards reaching goals.13 
Currently, the Campaign provides firm-, country- and region-level data and reports on 
microfinance activities worldwide, including the number of total and poorest clients, the 
percentage of women among the total clients. The Campaign takes two steps to improve 
the quality of the submitted data. First, a data verification process takes place for about 
40 per cent of the reporting institutions. All reporting institutions are required to provide 
a third-party verifier that can confirm the validity of the four key numbers provided: the 
total number of borrowers, the number of poorest borrowers, the percentage of 
borrowers who are women and the percentage of poorest borrowers who are women. 
Second, all of the submitted data are carefully examined and adjusted to avoid double-
counting borrowers. These two steps—third-party verifier and double-check process—
help to improve the quality and accuracy of the data. The MIX Market, which was 
launched in 2002, is a not-for-profit organisation that provides industry-, country- and 
region-level data on microfinance outreach and financial performance indicators. MIX 
sources data from audits, internal financial statements, management reports and other 
documents and complements these data with direct questions to the MFI. MIX analysts 
and partners enter all data into the database. All data are reviewed by MIX staff and 
validated against a set of business rules before publication. To ensure the accuracy of 
12 As mentioned earlier, in October 2015, the World Bank’s definition of extreme poverty was revised. 
However, this chapter does not use the new indicators because the World Bank continues to use the 2005 
PPP exchange rates and poverty lines for a number of key countries, including Bangladesh, Cabo Verde, 
Cambodia, Jordan and Lao People’s Democratic Republic. Both the old and new indicators show the 
percentage of poor people as a share of the total population. 
13 In 1997, the Campaign launched a nine-year campaign to reach 100 million of the world’s poorest 
families—especially the women of those families—with credit for self-employment and other financial 
and business services by 2005. In November 2006, the Campaign was relaunched with two new goals: to 
reach 175 million of the poorest families with credit for self-employment and other financial and business 
services, and to help 100 million families lift themselves out of extreme poverty. 
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the submitted data, MIX’s database review system conducts more than 135 quality 
checks. 
Having considered the following issues, this chapter uses the aggregate number of 
clients and the aggregate number of poorest clients from the Campaign to measure the 
depth of microfinance, and it uses the gross loan portfolio from MIX to measure the size 
of microfinance.14 First, data from the Campaign and MIX share different strengths. 
According to Bauchet and Morduch (2010), the Campaign serves more borrowers, on 
average, than MIX, given that many small, and some large, institutions report to the 
Campaign, while MIX mainly attracts medium-sized institutions. However, the 
weakness of the Campaign is that only one financial indicator—namely, operational 
self-sufficiency—is provided, and it is only reported by around 60 per cent of 
institutions. In contrast, the main strength of MIX is its diversity and quantity of 
financial indicators—for example, gross loan portfolios, operational self-sufficiency and 
total assets. Compared with the Campaign, all of these financial indicators are reported 
by more than 80 per cent of institutions (Bauchet & Morduch, 2010). Second, none of 
the existing studies tested their hypotheses using a combined data set from the 
Campaign and MIX (Hermes, 2014; Hisako & Shigeyuki, 2009; Imai et al., 2012). 
Therefore, it is necessary to examine the relationship between poverty and microfinance 
at the macro level with a combined data set so that the conclusions will be more reliable 
and robust. 
According to the Microcredit Summit Campaign Report 2015, 3,098 MFIs reported 
reaching 211.12 million borrowers in 2013. This was the largest number ever reported. 
Of these MFIs at the regional level, the Asia–Pacific region had the largest number 
(1,119), followed by Sub-Saharan Africa (1,045) and Latin America and the Caribbean 
(672). There were 166.99 million clients (see Figure 2.1), of which 101.43 million were 
the poorest clients, living on less than US$1.25 per day in the Asia–Pacific region. This 
was almost 10 times of the Latin America and Caribbean region, 10 times that of Sub-
Saharan Africa, 31 times of the Eastern Europe and Central Asia region and 32 times of 
the Middle East and North Africa region. This means that most clients can be found in 
the Asia–Pacific region, whereas the lowest number can be found in the North America 
and Western Europe region. The poorest participation—namely, the ratio of the poorest 
14 The Campaign uses the World Bank’s definition of poorest, so here the poorest clients refers to those 
individuals who live beneath a US$1.25 a day. 
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clients—ranges from 60.74 per cent in the Asia–Pacific region to 54.73 per cent in Sub-
Saharan Africa, 24.71 per cent in North America and Western Europe, 23.67 per cent in 
the Middle East and North Africa, 15.80 per cent in Latin America and the Caribbean 
and only 2.03 per cent in Eastern Europe and Central Asia. This suggests that the Asia–
Pacific region has the highest poorest participation, while the Eastern Europe and 
Central Asia region and the Latin America and Caribbean region have the lowest. 
Figure 2.1: Total clients and poorest clients of MFIs in 2013 (region level) 
Source: Author’s compilation using data from the Microcredit Summit Campaign Report 2015 
Finally, this chapter includes a set of control variables from previous studies that have 
been found to relate to poverty. These include: 1) overall income per capita to capture 
the contribution of economic development (GDP per capita); 2) consumer price index 
(CPI) to control for the macroeconomic environment (inflation rate); 3) domestic credit 
to private sector by banks as a share of GDP to assess the overall development of the 
financial sector (private credit); 4) democracy index to measure the level of institutional 
democracy in a country; 5) gross secondary school enrolment, which is a proxy for the 
level of human capital (education); and 6) sum of exports and imports to GDP to 
capture the degree of openness. General government final consumption expenditure as a 
share of GDP is also included as a control variable. 
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All of these variables were obtained from the World Bank’s World Development 
Indicators database, except for the democracy index, which was obtained from the 
Integrated Network for Societal Conflict Research (INSCR).15 The democracy index is 
an additive 11-point scale ranging from 0 to 10, where 0 represents no democracy and 
10 represents full democracy. Table 2.1 presents the summary statistics for each 
variable and provides detailed descriptions of them. 
 
                                                 
15 http://www.systemicpeace.org 
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Table 2.1: Summary statistics 
Variable Description Year Obs. Mean Std Dev. Min. Max. 
PH125 Poverty headcount ratio at US$1.25 a day (PPP) (%) 1998–2013 592 14.75 19.33 0 87.72 
PH2 Poverty headcount ratio at US$2 a day (PPP) (%) 1998–2013 592 26.74 26.46 0 95.41 
PG125 Poverty gap at US$1.25 a day (PPP) (%) 1998–2013 592 5.637 8.774 0 52.76 
PG2 Poverty gap at US$2 a day (PPP) (%) 1998–2013 592 11.36 13.86 0 67.58 
GLP Gross loan portfolio (per client) 2003–2013 754 1,377 2,320 0 25,629 
ANC Aggregate number of clients/total population (%) 1998–2008 825 0.0116 0.0252 0 0.274 
ANPC Aggregate number of poorest clients/total population (%) 1998–2008 825 0.00726 0.0197 0 0.262 
GDP per capita GDP/total population (constant 2005 US$) 1998–2013 1,673 2,467 2,512 129.8 15,423 
Inflation CPI (annual %) 1998–2013 1,643 9.234 22.45 −35.84 513.9 
Domestic credit Domestic credit to private sector by banks/GDP (%) 1998–2013 1,636 29.07 24.36 0.154 153.4 
Education Gross secondary school enrolment (%) 1998–2013 1,233 63.16 27.27 5.132 114.6 
Government General government final consumption expenditure/GDP (%) 1998–2013 1,582 14.47 5.513 2.058 42.51 
Democracy Level of democracy in a country (0–10) 1998–2013 1,568 5.158 3.470 0 10 
Openness Sum of exports and imports/GDP (%) 1998–2013 1,623 80.07 37.25 16.44 321.6 
Population Total population 1998–2013 1,696 4.870e+07 1.690e+08 132,284 1.360e+09 
Notes: Gross loan portfolio (per client): MIX Market (www.mixmarket.org). Aggregate number of clients/total population (%) and aggregate number of poorest clients/total 
population (%) are author’s compilation based on the data set from the Microcredit Summit Campaign (http://www.microcreditsummit.org). Democracy index: INSCR 
(http://www.systemicpeace.org). Others: World Bank Development Indicators database (http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/world-development-indicators). 
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2.5 Empirical results 
The empirical results of estimating Equation (2.1) are reported in Table 2.2 and 2.3. 
Specifically, Table 2.2 displays the results using the Heckman two-step method after 
only controlling for the sample selection bias, while Table 2.3 presents the results from 
the two-stage model—the combined Heckman two-step method—controlling for both 
sample selection bias and endogeneity. Microfinance is measured differently in each 
column in the tables. Columns (1), (4), (7) and (10) use the aggregate number of 
clients/total population (ANC) as the depth measure, while columns (2), (5), (8) and 
(11) use the aggregate number of poorest clients/total population (ANPC) and columns 
(3), (6), (9) and (12) use gross loan portfolio (GLP) as the size measure. For poverty 
measures, columns (1)–(6) in each table employ the poverty headcount ratio as the 
measure of poverty, while columns (7)–(12) use the poverty gap. 
The results of the Heckman two-step method after controlling for sample selection bias 
are presented in Table 2.2. Sample selection bias is a valid concern because the IMR is 
significant at different levels in every column. All 12 columns consistently display a 
negative coefficient between the three microfinance variables and two poverty 
variables. More importantly, in columns (1), (3), (4), (7) and (10), this negative 
coefficient is statistically significant for both ANC and GLP at different levels. For 
example, in column (4), the coefficient is −1.18, suggesting that a 10 per cent increase 
in participation of microfinance programs (ANC) is associated with a 0.18 unit decrease 
in the poverty gap at US$2 a day, all else being equal. Another interesting finding here 
is that ANPC, another microfinance variable from the Campaign, does not show a 
significant relationship with the poverty variables in all columns. 
Table 2.3 presents the results from the combined Heckman two-step method, controlling 
for both sample selection bias and endogeneity. The IMR is significant at different 
levels in almost every column, so sample selection bias is a valid concern. Most of the 
regressions from columns (1)–(12) consistently confirm the hypothesis that 
microfinance is negatively associated with poverty, regardless of the microfinance and 
poverty measures used. For example, column (5) suggests that a 10 per cent increase in 
ANPC is associated with a 0.085 unit decrease in the poverty headcount ratio at US$2 
per day, all else being equal. Similarly, in the case of column (3), a 10 per cent increase 
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in GLP is associated with a 0.126 unit decrease in the poverty headcount ratio at 
US$1.25 per day, all else being equal. However, there is a notable difference in poverty-
reducing effects between the three microfinance variables. In most columns, the 
coefficient of GLP is found to be larger than that of another two variables—namely, 
ANC and ANPC. 
For the control variables, Table 2.3 shows that some are significantly associated with 
poverty variables, and their signs are consistent with prior expectations. This 
particularly holds for the variables measuring overall income per capita, inflation, 
education, democracy and openness. For instance, column (2) shows a negative 
relationship between education and the poverty headcount ratio, indicating that the 
poverty level decreases by around 1.5 units when education increases by 10 units, all 
else being equal. Similarly, democracy is also found to be negatively associated with 
poverty variables in most columns. Column (6) suggests that the poverty headcount 
ratio at US$2 per day decreases by around 1.22 units when democracy rises by 1 unit, 
all else being equal. Poverty declines as democracy intensifies, which is consistent with 
standard political economy theories (Gradstein, Milanovic, & Ying, 2001). 
Table 2.4 provides information about which of the two statistical problems—sample 
selection bias and endogeneity—affect the bias in the coefficient of the poverty–
microfinance relationship. For the sake of brevity, only the coefficients and t-values 
reposted in square brackets are provided. The first column reports the results after 
controlling only for sample selection bias using the Heckman (1976, 1977) procedure 
(see Table 2.2). The second column shows the results after controlling for both sample 
selection bias and endogeneity (see Table 2.3). A comparison of the poverty-
microfinance coefficients in the combined Heckman two-step method with those in the 
traditional Heckman method shows that, after controlling for sample selection bias and 
endogeneity, the coefficients have become significant for most regressions. This 
supports the assumption that failure to control for sample selection bias and endogeneity 
results in an inaccurate coefficient for the poverty–microfinance relationship. 
Using different measures of microfinance and poverty, this chapter tests the robustness 
of the model. Microfinance is measured using both depth and size from two large-scale 
data collection projects: depth with ANC and ANPC from the Campaign, and size with 
GLP from MIX. Poverty is measured using two types of indicators from the World 
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Bank: the poverty headcount ratio and the poverty gap. Generally, columns (1)–(12) of 
Table 2.3 consistently support the main hypothesis that microfinance is negatively 
associated with poverty. However, it is worth noting that in these columns, GLP exerts a 
larger effect on poverty than ANC and ANPC. In relation to the control variables, the 
results support the findings reported in the previous section. Thus, it can be concluded 
that the model is robust. 
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Table 2.2: Results of Heckman two-step method, corrected for sample selection bias 
  Dependent variables 
 
Poverty headcount ratio at 
US$1.25 a day (PPP) (%) 
Poverty headcount ratio at 
US$2 a day (PPP) (%) 
Poverty gap at 
US$1.25 a day (PPP) (%) 
Poverty gap at 
US$2 a day (PPP) (%) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
ANC (log) −0.67**   −1.18**   −0.21*   −0.49**   
 
[−2.20]   [−2.25]   [−1.86]   [−2.27]   
ANPC (log)  −0.57   −0.77   −0.13   −0.35  
 
 [−1.21]   [−1.42]   [−0.83]   [−1.19]  
GLP (log)   −0.67*   −0.51   −0.29   −0.40 
 
  [−1.72]   [−0.87]   [−1.67]   [−1.46] 
GDP per capita −0.0038** −0.0051*** −0.0013 −0.0075*** −0.010*** −0.0040*** −0.0015*** −0.0020*** −0.00054 −0.0031*** −0.0042*** −0.0013** 
 
[−2.52] [−3.07] [−1.54] [−2.81] [−3.32] [−4.46] [−3.03] [−3.64] [−1.26] [−2.85] [−3.46] [−2.46] 
Inflation 0.058 0.065 −0.085 0.10 0.12* −0.10 0.021 0.023 −0.018 0.043 0.049* −0.050 
 
[1.45] [1.61] [−1.06] [1.64] [1.95] [−0.98] [1.50] [1.62] [−0.66] [1.54] [1.75] [−0.96] 
Domestic credit 0.074 0.019 −0.033 0.085 −0.025 −0.066 0.044 0.023 −0.00083 0.059 0.013 −0.019 
 
[1.27] [0.30] [−0.65] [1.12] [−0.31] [−0.97] [1.38] [0.69] [−0.036] [1.33] [0.29] [−0.58] 
Education −0.16** −0.093 −0.14** −0.18 −0.057 −0.12 −0.079** −0.057* −0.067** −0.12** −0.065 −0.092* 
 
[−2.24] [−1.26] [−2.07] [−1.65] [−0.48] [−1.04] [−2.58] [−1.82] [−2.41] [−2.27] [−1.21] [−1.88] 
Government 0.28 0.29 −0.16 0.23 0.29 −0.55 0.24* 0.26* −0.022 0.24 0.27 −0.15 
 
[1.23] [0.99] [−0.51] [0.79] [0.81] [−0.96] [1.93] [1.92] [−0.23] [1.48] [1.35] [−0.69] 
Democracy −0.54** −0.57*** −1.58*** −0.41 −0.44 −1.98*** −0.22*** −0.23*** −0.51 −0.33* −0.35** −1.05*** 
 
[−2.25] [−2.76] [−2.78] [−0.96] [−1.20] [−3.67] [−2.69] [−3.19] [−1.65] [−1.92] [−2.41] [−2.92] 
Openness −0.045 −0.083 0.030 −0.072 −0.15 0.036 −0.023 −0.038 0.0071 −0.036 −0.068 0.017 
 
[−0.71] [−1.22] [0.32] [−0.63] [−1.28] [0.23] [−0.96] [−1.48] [0.28] [−0.77] [−1.37] [0.26] 
IMR 69.6*** 74.2*** 11.1* 129*** 144*** 24.7** 26.0*** 28.6*** 3.94 54.4*** 59.5*** 9.41** 
 
[3.30] [3.00] [1.81] [3.35] [3.43] [2.50] [3.60] [3.16] [1.47] [3.55] [3.37] [2.16] 
Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 219 209 235 219 209 235 219 209 235 219 209 235 
R-squared 0.38 0.41 0.28 0.49 0.52 0.33 0.33 0.35 0.21 0.42 0.44 0.30 
Notes: Numbers in square brackets are t-values. ***, ** and * represent significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Table 2.3: Results of combined Heckman two-step method, corrected for sample selection bias and endogeneity 
 
Dependent variables 
 
Poverty headcount ratio at 
US$1.25 a day (PPP) (%) 
Poverty headcount ratio at 
US$2 a day (PPP) (%) 
Poverty gap at  
US$1.25 a day (PPP) (%) 
Poverty gap at  
US$2 a day (PPP) (%) 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
Lag of ANC (log) −0.58* 
  
−0.69* 
  
−0.34* 
  
−0.46* 
  
 
[−1.95] 
  
[−1.73] 
  
[−1.77] 
  
[−1.96] 
  
Lag of ANPC (log) 
 
−0.76 
  
−0.85* 
  
−0.38* 
  
−0.55* 
 
  
[−1.46] 
  
[−1.76] 
  
[−1.94] 
  
[−1.76] 
 
Lag of GLP (log) 
  
−1.26** 
  
−1.29* 
  
−0.43 
  
−0.74* 
   
[−2.07] 
  
[−1.72] 
  
[−1.38] 
  
[−1.69] 
GDP per capita −0.0036** −0.0037** −0.0012* −0.0069*** −0.0070** −0.0039*** −0.0016*** −0.0018*** −0.00049 −0.0030*** −0.0031** −0.0013*** 
 
[−2.56] [−2.07] [−1.78] [−3.16] [−2.65] [−4.21] [−3.47] [−3.14] [−1.64] [−3.10] [−2.64] [−2.89] 
Inflation 0.074* 0.086** −0.060 0.13** 0.15*** −0.082 0.023* 0.027** −0.0057 0.053* 0.061** −0.032 
 
[1.71] [2.20] [−0.72] [2.14] [2.71] [−0.72] [1.71] [2.24] [−0.19] [1.86] [2.41] [−0.60] 
Domestic credit 0.042 0.023 0.0087 −0.020 −0.058 −0.039 0.056 0.049 0.012 0.039 0.024 0.0015 
 
[0.48] [0.27] [0.20] [−0.18] [−0.61] [−0.66] [1.38] [1.33] [0.71] [0.64] [0.42] [0.055] 
Education −0.21** −0.15** −0.13** −0.23* −0.15 −0.11 −0.11*** −0.096*** −0.058** −0.15** −0.12** −0.084** 
 
[−2.25] [−2.03] [−2.42] [−1.76] [−1.41] [−1.24] [−3.41] [−3.35] [−2.45] [−2.49] [−2.32] [−2.20] 
Government 0.45 0.38 −0.075 0.61* 0.53 −0.36 0.21** 0.19* −0.0058 0.34* 0.29 −0.084 
 
[1.59] [1.15] [−0.36] [1.68] [1.40] [−0.88] [2.31] [1.76] [−0.071] [1.92] [1.48] [−0.54] 
Democracy −0.83** −0.80*** −0.76** −0.91 −0.84* −1.22*** −0.22** −0.23*** −0.16 −0.51** −0.49** −0.50*** 
 
[−2.26] [−2.83] [−2.22] [−1.47] [−1.69] [−3.64] [−2.09] [−2.71] [−1.63] [−2.04] [−2.57] [−2.96] 
Openness −0.11 −0.17* −0.013 −0.16 −0.25** −0.0048 −0.042 −0.058** −0.012 −0.080 −0.12** −0.011 
 
[−0.96] [−1.89] [−0.19] [−1.08] [−2.13] [−0.042] [−1.44] [−2.39] [−0.59] [−1.11] [−2.12] [−0.22] 
IMR 82.7*** 105** 10.3 135*** 151** 24.7** 37.4*** 54.0*** 3.42 64.8*** 82.2*** 8.80* 
 
[4.10] [2.52] [1.51] [4.57] [2.44] [2.07] [4.38] [3.62] [1.12] [4.68] [3.02] [1.72] 
Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 202 196 218 202 196 218 202 196 218 202 196 218 
R-squared 0.37 0.47 0.27 0.46 0.56 0.37 0.40 0.44 0.19 0.43 0.51 0.30 
Notes: Numbers in square brackets are t-values. ***, ** and * represent significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Table 2.4: Step by step approach 
 
Poverty headcount ratio at  
US$1.25 a day (PPP) (%) 
Poverty headcount ratio at  
US$2 a day (PPP) (%) 
 
(1) (2) (1) (2) 
 
Heckman two-step 
method 
Combined Heckman 
two-step method 
Heckman two-step 
method 
Combined Heckman 
two-step method 
ANC −0.67** −0.58* −1.18** −0.69* 
 
[−2.20] [−1.95] [−2.25] [−1.73] 
ANPC −0.57 −0.76 −0.77 −0.85* 
 
[−1.21] [−1.46] [−1.42] [−1.76] 
GLP −0.67* −1.26** −0.51 −1.29* 
 
[−1.72] [−2.07] [−0.87] [−1.72] 
 
Poverty gap at  
US$1.25 a day (PPP) (%) 
Poverty gap at  
US$2 a day (PPP) (%) 
 
(1) (2) (1) (2) 
 
Heckman two-step 
method 
Combined Heckman 
two-step method 
Heckman two-step 
method 
Combined Heckman 
two-step method 
ANC −0.21* −0.34* −0.49** −0.46* 
 
[−1.86] [−1.77] [−2.27] [−1.96] 
ANPC −0.13 −0.38* −0.35 −0.55* 
 
[−0.83] [−1.94] [−1.19] [−1.76] 
GLP −0.29 −0.43 −0.4 −0.74* 
 
[−1.67] [−1.38] [−1.46] [−1.69] 
Notes: Numbers in square brackets are t-values. ***, ** and * represent significance at the 1%, 5% and 
10% levels, respectively. 
2.6 Conclusion 
Given the evidence of the increasing number of MFIs and the increasing interest of 
development agencies, governments and other stakeholders, a better understanding of 
the effects of microfinance on poverty from a macro perspective is important. This 
chapter presents an overall picture of various microfinance programmes and offers some 
practical implications for the role of microfinance in alleviating poverty. 
This chapter uses a unique data set covering 106 countries for the 16-year period from 
1998 to 2013 to study the nexus between poverty and microfinance in developing and 
emerging countries. For the first time, the relationship between microfinance and 
poverty is examined at the macro level using data from both the Microcredit Summit 
Campaign and the MIX Market. The results show that microfinance has a significant 
and negative relationship with poverty. Further, the results confirm the negative 
relationship found by previous studies (Hermes, 2014; Hisako & Shigeyuki, 2009; Imai 
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et al., 2012). The negative relationship remains unchanged when the poverty headcount 
ratio is replaced by the poverty gap—both before and after controlling for sample 
selection bias and endogeneity—which indicates the robustness of the model. The 
results also suggest that microfinance reduces not only the incidence of poverty, but 
also its depth and severity.16 
However, microfinance is not the panacea. Numerous studies have shown that country-
specific and cultural factors are determinants in how microfinance will interact with 
poverty (Chowdhury, 2009), and there are occasionally devastating tales of failure in 
which the inability to repay a very small loan has plunged households further into 
desperate penury (Bateman, 2013). However, overall, the results support the assertion 
that microfinance is an effective tool for reducing poverty in most developing and 
emerging countries. It enables the poor to engage in self-employment and income-
generating activities, which helps them become financially independent and better able 
to break out of poverty. National governments and international development agencies 
should continue to promote microfinance as a tool for reducing poverty, while taking 
into account the limitations of any single strategy in tackling an entrenched global 
problem. 
  
                                                 
16 According to the World Bank, the poverty gap is the mean shortfall from the poverty line (counting the 
non-poor as having zero shortfall), expressed as a percentage of the poverty line. This measure reflects 
the depth of poverty as well as its incidence. However, Imai et al. (2012) found the same result in their 
study. 
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Appendix 2.1 
List of countries 
Asia and Pacific Middle East and North Africa Sub-Saharan Africa 
Bangladesh (3) Egypt (3) Angola (2) 
Bhutan (3) Iraq (2) Benin (2) 
Cambodia (6) Jordan (4) Botswana (2) 
China (6) Mauritania (3) Burkina Faso (3) 
Fiji (2) Morocco (3) Burundi (2) 
India (3) Syria (1) Cape Verde (2) 
Indonesia (6) Tunisia (3) Cameroon (2) 
Laos (3) Turkey (10) Central African (2) 
Malaysia (3) Yemen (20) Chad (2) 
Nepal (2)  Comoros (1) 
Pakistan (6)  Democratic Republic of Congo (1) 
Philippines (5)  Republic of Congo (2) 
Sri Lanka (3)  Cote D'Ivoire (3) 
Thailand (7)  Djibouti (1) 
Vietnam (7)  Ethiopia (3) 
  Gabon (1) 
  Gambia (2) 
Latin America and Caribbean Eastern Europe and Central Asia Ghana (2) 
Argentina (14) Albania (5) Guinea (3) 
Belize (2) Armenia (13) Kenya (1) 
Bolivia (12) Azerbaijan (6) Lesotho (2) 
Brazil (13) Bosnia and Herzegovina (3) Liberia (1) 
Chile (6) Bulgaria (6) Madagascar (4) 
Colombia (14) Croatia (6) Malawi (2) 
Costa Rica (15) Georgia (15) Mali (3) 
Dominican (13) Kazakhstan (9) Mauritius (2) 
Ecuador (13) Kyrgyzstan (13) Mozambique (2) 
El Salvador (15) Lithuania (11) Namibia (2) 
Guatemala (7) Macedonia (8) Niger (3) 
Haiti (1) Moldova (13) Nigeria (2) 
Honduras (13) Montenegro (7) Rwanda (3) 
Jamaica (4) Poland (13) Sao Tome and Principe (2) 
Mexico (9) Romania (14) Senegal (3) 
Nicaragua (4) Russia (10) Sierra Leone (2) 
Panama (14) Serbia (9) South Africa (4) 
Paraguay (13) Slovak (7) Swaziland (2) 
Peru (15) Tajikistan (5) Tanzania (3) 
Suriname (1) Ukraine (10) Togo (2) 
Uruguay (14)  Uganda (5) 
Venezuela (8)  Zambia (5) 
Notes: Number of observations (poverty headcount ratio at US$1.25 a day) from each country is in 
parentheses. According to the data set from the World Bank, all four poverty indicators have the same 
number of observations for the period 1998–2013. 
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Chapter 3: Does Microfinance Improve Gender Equality?17 
Sustainable Development Goal 5: 
Achieve gender equality and empower all women and girls. 
United Nations 
Microfinance enables poor women to engage in income-generating activities to help 
them become financially independent, thereby strengthening their decision-making 
power within the household and society. Consequently, microfinance has the potential 
to reduce gender inequality. Empirically, case study evidence from developing countries 
both supports and opposes this hypothesis. This chapter revisits the relationship 
between gender inequality and microfinance using panel data for 64 developing 
economies over the period 2003–2014. It employs macroeconomic data to provide more 
general representations for policy inferences. This chapter finds that women’s 
participation in microfinance is associated with a reduction in gender inequality across 
countries. However, regional interactions reveal that cultural factors are likely to 
influence the gender inequality–microfinance nexus. 
The rest of this chapter is organised as follows. Section 3.1 introduces the topic of this 
chapter, while Section 3.2 describes the data and methodology. Section 3.3 presents the 
empirical results, and Section 3.4 provides the conclusions. 
3.1 Introduction 
According to the United Nations (UN), gender equality refers to the equal rights, 
responsibilities and opportunities of women, men, girls and boys. This definition does 
not imply that women and men are the same, but that the interests, needs and priorities 
of both women and men are taken into consideration, recognising the diversity of 
different groups of women and men.18 While the world has achieved progress towards 
gender equality under the UN’s Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), women and 
girls continue to suffer discrimination and violence in many parts of the world. The 
                                                 
17  Part of Chapter 3 has been published: Zhang, Q. & Posso, A. (2017). Microfinance and gender 
inequality: Cross-country evidence. Applied Economics Letters, 24(20), 1494–1498. 
18 http://www.un.org/womenwatch/osagi/conceptsandefinitions.htm. 
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importance of gender equality is highlighted by its inclusion as one of the UN’s new 17 
Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) of the 2030 Agenda, which serves as a 
framework for ending all forms of poverty. 
Economists have long focused on the effective strategy of improving gender equality. 
The 1960s and early 1970s emphasised economic growth as the panacea to bring down 
gender inequality (Inglehart & Norris, 2003). During the 1980s and 1990s, the hope that 
economic growth would automatically benefit women in poor countries continued to be 
voiced (Beneria & Bisnath, 2001; Mundial, 2001). However, by the end of the twentieth 
century, it was clear that growth alone was not enough. For instance, Kuwait and Saudi 
Arabia are as rich as Sweden in terms of GDP per capita, but women in these countries 
continue to face discrimination in many aspects of their lives, and large legal gaps 
remain in protections for them. For instance, it was not until September 2017 that 
women were permitted to drive vehicles in Saudi Arabia.19 It has become evident that 
the problem of gender inequality is more complicated than the early development 
economists assumed (Inglehart & Norris, 2003). Thus, comprehensive packages for 
addressing gender inequality have gained in popularity. They include economic 
development, political institutions, legal reforms and culture change. Among these 
approaches, microfinance has been receiving increasing critical attention. 
The past 30 years have shown that microfinance is a proven development tool that is 
capable of providing a vast number of the poor—particularly women—with sustainable 
tailored financial services to enhance their welfare (McCarter, 2006). According to the 
Microcredit Summit Campaign Report 2015, 3,098 MFIs reached more than 211 million 
clients in 2013—114 million of whom were living in extreme poverty. Of these poorest 
clients, 82.6 per cent (more than 94 million) were women.20 To date, a few studies have 
found that microfinance contributes to gender equality, but these are mainly country- or 
area-specific case studies that primarily rely on micro-level evidence. The aim of this 
chapter is to contribute to the literature by examining the effect of microfinance on 
gender equality at the macroeconomic level. 
                                                 
19 Here, GDP per capita is based on PPP (constant 2011 international $) provided by the World Bank 
(http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/world-development-indicators). 
20 The Microcredit Summit Campaign uses the World Bank’s definition of ‘extreme poverty’ to mean 
those living on less than US$1.90 per day PPP (the recently updated international poverty line). 
http://stateofthecampaign.org/2015-footnotes/. 
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3.2 Literature review 
It has been argued that providing women with access to credit would strengthen their 
decision-making power within the household. In a simple decision-making bargaining 
model between men and women, once women get access to credit their relative 
bargaining power potentially increases. Thus, households, altogether, can potentially 
become more likely to spend recourses to improve their reproductive health, and 
education. Additionally, women can potentially more successfully bargain to participate 
in labour markets (Armendáriz & Morduch, 2010; Kabeer, 2005; Pitt et al., 2006). Thus, 
by empowering women, microfinance has the potential to reduce gender inequality 
(Cheston & Kuhn, 2002). When gender inequality is measured by health, labour market 
and education variables, case study evidence from around the developing world both 
supports and contradicts this premise. 
Several studies have found that microfinance plays a positive role in reducing gender 
inequality. For example, using data from a large household survey conducted in rural 
Bangladesh in 1998–1999, Pitt et al. (2006) examined the effects of both men’s and 
women’s participation in group-based microfinance programmes on various indicators 
of women’s empowerment. Their results demonstrated that women’s participation in 
microfinance programmes helps to increase their decision-making within the household. 
Swain and Wallentin (2009) reached a similar conclusion for India. 
Other studies have different findings. Microfinance does not ‘automatically’ lower 
gender inequality (Kabeer, 2005). To achieve this goal, Kabeer (2005) suggested that 
microfinance needs to act together with other interventions, such as education and 
access to waged work. Kabeer (2005) also noted the need for caution in discussing the 
effect of microfinance on gender inequality in particular contexts because MFIs vary 
considerably in the contexts in which they work. Similarly, Kabeer (2001), Mahmood 
(2011) and Ngo and Wahhaj (2012) argued that gender inequality ultimately depends on 
context and cultural norms, which determine autonomy over production. Mahmood 
(2011) emphasised the importance for women to obtain business-related training. He 
argued that the lack of training by MFIs is considered a factor in the small number of 
women starting new businesses from their loans. Without autonomy, funds are 
appropriated by men, which increases gender inequality. Similarly, Ngo and Wahhaj 
(2012) found that MFIs with different levels of innovativeness are likely to have 
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heterogeneous effects across households and that, in some cases, female borrowers may 
experience a decline in welfare. They identified that women who receive business-
related training in an activity that involves their husband’s cooperation are more likely 
to be empowered than those who receive some training in an autonomous productive 
activity that they can undertake independently within the household. Finally, 
microfinance has an ambiguous effect on education because it simultaneously raises 
resource constraints, lifts demand for schooling and increases the opportunity cost of 
education through more productive opportunities (Maldonado, González-Vega, & 
Romero, 2003). Gender inequality increases when this affects girls more than boys, or 
in different ways. Two recent studies by Agier and Szafarz (2013) and Brana (2013) 
reached the same conclusion. For example, using a database comparing 34,000 loan 
applications from a Brazilian MFI covering the 11-year period 1997–2007, Agier and 
Szafarz (2013) found no gender bias in loan assessment, but there is a glass ceiling 
effect that hurts female entrepreneurs undertaking large projects. In particular, the 
gender gap in loan size increases disproportionately with respect to the scale of the 
borrower’s projects. That is, women are likely to face harsher conditions than men 
regarding borrowing possibilities. That is, microfinance hinders gender equality. By 
following a group of 3,640 microcredit applicants in France over the period 2000–2006, 
Brana (2013) identified the profiles of these MFIs to uncover the gender differences in 
borrowers compared with another larger sample of entrepreneurs. She reported that 
among company founders, one in five women were on state benefits compared with one 
in 10 men. Among microfinance beneficiaries, this rate was almost the same between 
men and women (one in two). That is, the male–female gap among company founders 
was also maintained among clients of MFIs in France. Evidence from Brana (2013) also 
suggests that gender is a decisive factor regarding the amount of credit provided to 
borrowers when compared with other factors in the borrower and firm profile. Brana 
(2013) argued that it is in this sense that MFIs reinforce gender inequalities. 
This chapter investigates the effect of microfinance on gender equality at the 
macroeconomic level using a panel of 64 developing economies over the period 2003–
2014. The macroeconomic approach based on cross-country data provides a clearer 
picture of whether microfinance contributes to gender equality in developing countries. 
The contribution of this chapter is twofold. First, it is the first rigorous global study on 
the effect of microfinance on gender equality. The results show that, overall, women’s 
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participation in microfinance is associated with a reduction in gender inequality across 
developing countries. Second, using regional interactions in the regression, this chapter 
reveals that cultural factors are likely to influence the gender inequality–microfinance 
nexus. 
3.3 Methodology and model 
The cross-national relationship between microfinance and gender inequality that is used 
in this chapter builds on existing macroeconomic models (Beer, 2009; Forsythe, 
Korzeniewicz, & Durrant, 2000): 
 𝐺𝐼𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽𝑃𝑊𝐵𝑖𝑡 + 𝛾𝑿𝑖,𝑡+𝛼𝑖 + 𝜆𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡,     (3.1) 
where the vector, 𝑃𝑊𝐵𝑖𝑡, is the proportion of women borrowers in microfinance and the 
vector, 𝑿𝑖𝑡, contains a set of control variables, such as national income and democracy. 
The term, 𝛼𝑖, is a country dummy (country fixed effects) that controls for omitted time-
invariant characteristics (e.g., the country is mountainous or seaside), while 𝜆𝑡 is a time 
dummy (year fixed effects) that controls for omitted time-variant shocks that every 
country suffers (e.g., the Global Financial Crisis). The term, 𝜀𝑖𝑡, is an idiosyncratic error 
term. The dependent variable, GI, is the variable of gender inequality and is measured 
on a 0–1 scale (see Section 3.4). Censored data of this type are usually estimated using 
Tobit models. However, in this case, no country exhibits values that are equal to either 0 
or 1, which means that the values given are ‘true’ representations of gender inequality 
(Cameron & Trivedi, 2005). Thus, consistent estimators are obtained from fixed-effects 
(FE) models. This variable is expressed in a natural logarithm so that coefficient 
estimates are interpreted as elasticities or semi-elasticities. 
To study whether unobserved country-level characteristics affect the relationship 
between microfinance and gender inequality in the model, see Equation (3.2): 
 𝐺𝐼𝑖𝑡 = 𝛾𝑿𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜃1𝑃𝑊𝐵𝑖𝑡𝑹𝑖 + 𝛼𝑖 + 𝜆𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡, (3.2) 
where 𝑹𝑖 is a vector of regional dummy variables for Latin America and the Caribbean 
(LAC), Middle East and North Africa (MENA), South Asia (SA), Europe and Central 
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Asia (ECA), East Asia and the Pacific (EAP) and Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA). The 
equations are estimated using heteroscedasticity robust standard errors.21 
3.4 Data 
3.4.1 Dependent variable 
There are a number of international comparative gender inequality indices. Each index 
focuses on a distinct list of parameters, and the choice of parameters affects the outcome 
for each country. Among them are the Gender-related Development Index (GDI) and 
the Gender Inequality Index (GII). The GDI considers inequalities by gender in three 
basic dimensions of human development—health, knowledge and living standards—
using the same component indicators as in the Human Development Index (HDI). 
Introduced by the UN in 2010, the GII updates and replaces the GDI by excluding 
income imputations because of associated measurement errors (United Nations 
Development Programme, 2010). In contrast to the GDI, the GII does not rely on 
imputations. It includes three critical dimensions for women—reproductive health, 
empowerment and labour market participation—and ranges from 0 (no inequality in the 
included dimensions) to 1 (complete inequality). It should be noted that the GII is not a 
perfect measure. Among its shortcomings is the bias towards elites that remains in some 
indicators (e.g., parliamentary representation). However, as constructed, the GII has 
already provided an adequate and relevant comparative measure of gender inequality. In 
this chapter, gender inequality is measured using both the GDI and the GII. As 
mentioned above, the GII is available from 2010 to 2014, while the GDI is available 
from 2003 to 2009. Both variables are measured on a 0–1 scale; however, larger values 
of the GDI imply lower gendered disparity, while the opposite is true for the GII. 
3.4.2 Independent variable 
Two large-scale data collection projects provide data for the key variable PWB: the 
Microcredit Summit Campaign and the MIX Market. This study employs MIX data for 
                                                 
21 A test for potential endogeneity was conducted before estimating Equations (3.1) and (3.2). It is 
possible that providing funds to women could be easier in countries with greater gender equality. Further, 
GI and GNP per capita are potentially endogenous because improvements in GI may enhance economic 
development by, for instance, increasing the number of women in the labour market. This chapter 
performs Hausman–endogeneity tests and concludes that the variables can be treated as exogenous. Under 
the null hypothesis that PWB can be treated as exogenous, the chi-squared p-value from the Hausman test 
is 0.61. The corresponding p-value for an endogeneity test of GNP per capita is 0.25. 
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two reasons. First, MIX reports data from more than 80 per cent of institutions 
worldwide compared with the Campaign (60 per cent). Second, the Campaign provides 
firm-level data that contain a considerable number of missing values and typographical 
errors, making it difficult to aggregate at the country level (Bauchet & Morduch, 2010). 
In contrast, MIX produces readily available country-level indicators. The key variable, 
PWB, is logged for ease of interpretation. 
Following other macroeconomic gender inequality models, this model controls for 
economic development measured by gross national income (GNI) per capita (logged), 
which is available from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators (Forsythe et 
al., 2000). Following Inglehart and Norris (2003) and Beer (2009), democracy is also 
included and is measured using an 11-point scale ranging from 0 to 10, where 0 
represents no democracy and 10 represents full democracy. These data are obtained 
from the INSCR. Table 3.1 presents the summary statistics. 
Table 3.1: Descriptive statistics 
  Obs. Mean Std Dev. Min. Max. 
GII 267 0.47 0.12 0.14 0.72 
GDI 297 0.64 0.16 0.28 0.87 
Proportion of women borrowers 564 0.57 0.21 0.02 0.99 
GNI per capita (log) 564 7.59 1.07 5.31 9.56 
Democracy 564 5.89 3.17 0 10 
EAP 564 0.09 0.28 0 1 
ECA 564 0.20 0.40 0 1 
LAC 564 0.29 0.45 0 1 
MENA 564 0.06 0.23 0 1 
SA 564 0.07 0.26 0 1 
SSA 564 0.29 0.46 0 1 
Notes: The GII is available from 2010 to 2014 and the GDI is available from 2003 to 2009.  
3.5 Empirical results 
Columns (1) and (4) of Table 3.2 present the results of Equation (3.1). Both 
specifications indicate that an increase in the proportion of women borrowers is 
associated with a decline in gender inequality. Column (1) shows that an increase in the 
proportion of women borrowers by 10 per cent is associated with an improvement in the 
GDI by 0.38 per cent, while column (4) indicates that a similar change in the proportion 
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of women borrowers is associated with a fall in the GII by 0.15 per cent, all else being 
equal. 
Columns (2) and (5) present the results from Equation (3.2). The data suggest that the 
main results are driven by economies in the ECA and MENA regions. An increase in 
the proportion of women borrowers is associated with a decline in gender inequality in 
each region. A few reasons may explain why an increase in the proportion of women 
borrowers has a statistically significant effect in the ECA and MENA regions. First, 
because they are more conservative societies, an increase in the proportion of women 
borrowers in more gender-unequal societies can have a larger marginal effect on gender 
inequality than a similar increase in more gender-equal countries. Second, in these 
regions, microfinance is an emerging industry; therefore, its marginal effect on gender 
inequality is still positive. Third, MFIs in these regions may have some innovative ways 
of reducing gender inequality, such as a variety of training activities (Ngo & Wahhaj, 
2012). 
Table 3.2: FE estimation 
Dependent variable GDI GII 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Log GNI per capita 0.0019 0.0028 0.0018 −0.079** −0.082** −0.078** 
 
[0.17] [0.25] [0.17] [−2.20] [−2.24] [−2.11] 
Democracy 0.00068 0.00083 0.00061 −0.0061 −0.0071 −0.0063 
 
[0.90] [1.31] [0.81] [−1.26] [−1.42] [−1.30] 
Log PWB 0.038*** 
 
0.027* −0.015** 
 
−0.016* 
 
[3.43] 
 
[1.94] [−2.11] 
 
[−1.91] 
Log PWB*EAP 
 
−0.0022 
  
0.011 
 
  
[−0.066] 
  
[0.42] 
 
Log PWB*ECA 
 
0.041** 
  
−0.037** 
 
  
[2.06] 
  
[−2.45] 
 
Log PWB*LAC 
 
−0.019 
  
−0.0096 
 
  
[−0.76] 
  
[−0.41] 
 
Log PWB*MENA 
 
0.047** 
  
−0.077*** 
 
  
[2.66] 
  
[−3.51] 
 
Log PWB*SA 
 
−0.14*** 
  
0.0085 
 
  
[−6.06] 
  
[0.49] 
 
Log PWB*SSA 
 
0.073** 
  
−0.014 
 
  
[2.36] 
  
[−1.65] 
 
Log PWB*Muslim 
  
0.026 
  
0.0067 
   
[1.18] 
  
[0.51] 
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Country and year FE? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 297 297 297 267 267 267 
R-squared 0.64 0.67 0.65 0.40 0.40 0.40 
Notes: Numbers in square brackets are t-values. ***, ** and * represent significance at the 1%, 5% and 
10% levels, respectively. 
Column (2) shows that the proportion of women borrowers is associated with worsening 
gender inequality in the SA region. This is consistent with findings from some regional 
studies. Leach and Sitaram (2002) found that the rising proportion of women borrowers 
has often marginalised men, who have responded by sabotaging projects, appropriating 
funds and sometimes being violent. Agier and Szafarz (2013) found a glass ceiling 
effect that hurts female entrepreneurs undertaking large projects. In this sense, 
microfinance worsens gender equality. Apart from these explanations, another potential 
reason may lie in the context of SA, as previously suggested by Kabeer (2001, 2005) 
and Mahmood (2011). Microfinance began in SA and later gained popularity in other 
regions (Armendáriz & Morduch, 2010). Driven by the expectation of improving gender 
inequality, microfinance has been so overemphasised in SA that its marginal effect has 
turned negative. The results are inconclusive for SSA. Column (2) suggests that the 
proportion of women borrowers is associated with improving gender inequality, but 
column (5) does not confirm this relationship. One possible explanation may be the 
difference between the GII and the GDI. The GDI focuses more on income, while the 
GII focuses on health, education, political representation and labour market 
participation (United Nations Development Programme, 2010). 
Given that ECA and MENA are predominantly Muslim, columns (3) and (6) estimate 
models using Muslim-nation dummies interacting with the proportion of women 
borrowers.22 The results from both columns suggest that while cultural factors are likely 
to play a role in determining how microfinance interacts with gender inequality, Islam 
cannot explain this role. 
Finally, when using the GII as the dependent variable, the results show that an increase 
in GNI per capita is associated with a decline in gender inequality. However, this is not 
the case for GDI, perhaps because it is measured using income differentials between 
men and women. 
                                                 
22 Muslim-country dummies are obtained from Grim and Karim (2011), who defined a nation as Muslim 
if at least 50 per cent of its population identified with that religion. 
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3.6 Conclusion 
As microfinance has increased in popularity around the world, a better understanding of 
the effect of microfinance on gender equality from a macroeconomic perspective is 
essential. This chapter tests for macroeconomic evidence of a relationship between 
women’s participation in microfinance and gender inequality using panel data for 64 
developing and emerging countries over the period 2003–2014. Gender inequality is 
measured using two main indices from the UN—namely, the GDI and the GII. The key 
variable of significance in the analysis is a gendered indicator of microfinance usage, 
which is defined as the proportion of women borrowers. This measure is constructed 
using microfinance data from the MIX Market, which is a microfinance auditing firm. 
The findings do not support the hypothesis. Rather, this chapter found that by providing 
women with access to credit, MFIs can potentially reduce gender inequality by 
strengthening women’s decision-making power within the household and society. 
This chapter also considers that microfinance does not automatically empower women 
because country-level and cultural characteristics can influence the gender inequality–
microfinance nexus. In this case, the relationship is driven by economies in the MENA 
and ECA regions. It is found that Islam—the prominent religion in these regions—is not 
a significant determining factor. Therefore, other unobserved country-specific or 
cultural characteristics are likely to play a role in determining how microfinance 
interacts with gender inequality. These factors include the degree to which a society is 
conservative and gender-equal, the status quo of the microfinance industry and the way 
in which microfinance innovates to reduce gender inequality. For instance, many firms 
acknowledge the difficulties associated with women working outside the home in 
certain communities, so they help women to establish small businesses at home, 
sometimes pulling resources together across households. Future studies should explore 
this area. 
Given that gender inequality is measured as composite indices of health, education and 
income indicators, it is natural to conclude that greater access to credit in women’s 
hands will mean greater access to education and health, as well as income-generating 
opportunities. Thus, more microcredit in developing nations is good news for women. 
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Given these positive outcomes, governments and international organisations in 
developing countries should continue to promote microcredit institutions to indirectly 
empower women. However, they must take into account that microfinance does not 
automatically empower women. Country-specific and cultural factors play a key role in 
determining how microfinance interacts with gender inequality, and these factors should 
be considered when assessing the effect of microcredit in the developing world. 
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Chapter 4: Multidimensional Financial Exclusion Index 
The Universal Financial Access (UFA) 2020 Goal: 
By 2020, adults, who currently aren’t part of the formal financial system, have access 
to a transaction account to store money, send and receive payments as the basic 
building block to manage their financial lives. 
The World Bank 
Existing macroeconomic indices of financial exclusion and inclusion are useful for 
determining the overall level of financial integration in an economy. However, 
macroeconomic indices cannot shed light on how individuals or households are 
deprived of financial opportunities within countries—particularly when financial 
services are available. This chapter proposes a new multidimensional financial 
exclusion index that brings together information on financial exclusion at the 
microeconomic level. This index is developed by applying a methodology similar to 
that used for measuring the Multidimensional Poverty Index (MPI). The index has four 
key components that build on the World Bank’s definition of financial inclusion. These 
are measured according to whether a household has access to financial services that 
allow it to make transactions and payments, save, obtain credit and purchase insurance. 
Using a nationally representative household survey from China, this exercise highlights 
the value of the index by showing key differences in access to financial services based 
on demographic factors such as age, education and ethnicity. 
The rest of this chapter is organised as follows. Section 4.1 introduces the topic and 
reviews the relevant literature. Section 4.2 discusses the conceptualisation of the new 
index. Section 4.3 describes the methodology. Section 4.4 presents the results of the 
empirical exercise, and Section 4.5 concludes. 
4.1 Introduction 
Financially excluded households or individuals do not have the opportunity to save 
income or mitigate against shocks through insurance services (Demirgüç-Kunt et al., 
2015). However, the ability to understand the extent to which financial exclusion hurts 
individuals or households has been limited by the availability of data and conceptual 
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inconsistencies (Cámara & Tuesta, 2014). Indeed, measures of financial exclusion and 
inclusion vary significantly both within and across countries. 
For example, financial exclusion has been measured by penetration (using the number 
of automated teller machines or bank branches), usage (using deposit and credit 
accounts) and macroeconomic indicators (using M2 over GDP). However, there is a 
growing consensus that these measures alone cannot fully capture the ways in which 
people access financial services. Therefore, economists have increasingly argued that a 
composite index that incorporates these variables is needed. This index should 
aggregate several indicators into a single variable to summarise the complex nature of 
financial exclusion and monitor its evolution across time and space (Cámara & Tuesta, 
2014; Chakravarty & Pal, 2013; Chibba, 2009; Sarma, 2008). 
Thus, a growing number of studies have proposed multidimensional financial exclusion 
indices using macroeconomic data. For example, the World Economic Forum (2008) 
calculated a Financial Development Index with seven dimensions: institutional 
environment, business environment, financial stability, banking financial services, non-
banking financial services, financial markets and financial access. Ang (2009) measured 
financial development with a composite index consisting of four dimensions: the ratio 
of the number of commercial bank offices per 1,000 people, the ratio of (M3–M1) to 
nominal GDP, the ratio of commercial bank assets to the sum of central bank assets and 
commercial bank assets, and the ratio of bank claims on the private sector to nominal 
GDP. Massara and Mialou (2014) and Cámara and Tuesta (2014) constructed composite 
indices of financial inclusion based on outreach and use. Love and Zicchino (2006) 
designed an index of financial development by taking an average of five standardised 
indices from Demirgüç-Kunt and Levine (1996): (1) market capitalisation over GDP; 
(2) total value traded over GDP; (3) total value traded over market capitalisation; 
(4) M3 to GDP; and (5) credit going to the private sector over GDP. 
These macroeconomic indices are useful for determining the overall level of financial 
exclusion in a country. However, macroeconomic indices cannot shed light on how 
individuals or households are deprived in taking advantage of financial opportunities 
within their community—particularly when financial services are available. Therefore, 
this chapter proposes a new MFEI that brings together information on financial 
exclusion at the microeconomic level to complement macroeconomic studies. 
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This new index can benefit stakeholders and policymakers by shedding light on the 
individual- or household-level characteristics that determine or prevent the uptake of 
financial services. Further, this index can investigate how microeconomic variables 
such as income, age, ethnicity and gender can influence access to financial services 
within countries and communities. As with its macro-level counterpart, the micro-level 
MFEI can also summarise the complex nature of financial exclusion, but at the 
household level. 
The MFEI is developed by applying a methodology similar to that used for measuring 
the MPI, which is a widely used and accepted household-level index (Alkire & Foster, 
2011; Alkire & Santos, 2010). This chapter computes the index using a nationally 
representative household survey from more than 8,000 Chinese households conducted 
in 2011. It then uses the index to show key differences in access to financial services 
based on demographic factors. 
4.2 Conceptualisation 
The way in which financial exclusion is measured depends on how it is conceptually 
defined. This chapter follows the World Bank’s definition of financial exclusion as a 
lack of access to useful and affordable financial products and services that meet the 
individual’s needs for transactions and payments, savings, credit and insurance (World 
Bank, 2017). 
According to this definition, one pillar of financial exclusion is the ability of individuals 
to access services that allow them to purchase goods and services and store wealth. 
Macroeconomic studies usually proxy this indicator with the size of the ‘banked’ 
population, or the proportion of people with access to a transaction account (Cámara & 
Tuesta, 2014; Chakravarty & Pal, 2013; Massara & Mialou, 2014; Park & Mercado Jr, 
2015; Sarma, 2008). A microeconomic counterpart to this measure could simply be 
measured with variables that determine whether a household or individual has access to 
a checking account. 
Access to savings is another pillar of financial exclusion. Intuitively, households forego 
current consumption to increase future consumption to maximise inter-temporal utility. 
Macroeconomic studies traditionally incorporate savings into financial exclusion 
indicators using measures such as deposit accounts per 1,000 adults (Massara & Mialou, 
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2014). A microeconomic approach to measuring savings is similar. Access to savings 
can be determined using variables that capture whether households have access to bank 
term deposits, stocks, funds, bonds and other financial products. Bodie, Merton and 
Cleeton (2009) argued that these financial instruments can be grouped into three 
categories: debt, including term deposits and bonds; equity, including stocks; and 
derivatives, including futures, forward contracts, swaps, and other financial instruments. 
While savings essentially allow households to smooth consumption through time by 
foregoing present consumption for future consumption, credit allows households to 
forego future consumption for present consumption. Macroeconomic studies have 
typically included measures, such as the proportion of people who receive credit, as a 
measure of this dimension (Cámara & Tuesta, 2014; Sarma, 2008). A microeconomic 
counterpart can similarly be based on whether a household or individual has a loan or 
credit card. 
Finally, households also use financial services for insurance to help build resilience 
against covariate and idiosyncratic shocks (Bodie et al., 2009). This need can be met by 
purchasing various types of insurance products, including life insurance, health 
insurance and property insurance. Macroeconomic studies do not usually include 
insurance controls. The microeconomic approach can simply capture this information 
with a question regarding whether households have access to insurance services. 
4.3 Methodology 
To compute the MFEI, this chapter adopts a strategy similar to the computation of the 
MPI by Alkire and Santos (2010, 2013), Alkire and Foster (2010), Dotter and Klasen 
(2017) and Jāhāna (2015). The methodology of the MPI is borrowed because it is the 
most prominent new development index that focuses on household-level and 
microeconomic indicators. The MPI has been estimated for more than 100 economies 
since 2010, with the results published annually alongside the HDI in the United Nations 
Development Programme’s Human Development Report (United Nations Development 
Programme, 2010). 
The MPI is calculated as η x α, where η is the headcount or the percentage of people 
who are identified as multidimensionally poor and α is the average intensity of poverty 
among the poor. The headcount measure, η, is similar to the widely used headcount 
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poverty ratio (Foster, Greer, & Thorbecke, 1984). It has the advantage of being easy to 
communicate and allows for comparisons with existing poverty measures. The inclusion 
of the average intensity, α, ensures that the MPI simultaneously concerns itself with 
identifying the incidence of poverty, as well as the depth of the deprivation being 
experienced. The MPI includes information on 10 indicators of wellbeing that are 
grouped into three equally weighted dimensions: health, education and a non-monetary 
standard of living (United Nations Development Programme, 2010). 
Consequently, to compute the MFEI, this chapter assigns each household a deprivation 
score 𝑐 using the indicators described in the previous section. A cut-off of 50 per cent, 
which is equivalent to half of the weighted indicators, is used to distinguish between 
excluded and included; therefore, if 𝑐  is smaller than 50 per cent, the household is 
included, and vice versa.23 In the latter case, this chapter further distinguishes two cases: 
moderately excluded households, in which the deprivation score is greater than 50 per 
cent but less than or equal to 75 per cent; and severely excluded, in which the score is 
greater than 75 per cent. 
Similarly, the headcount ratio, 𝐻, measures the proportion of people who are financially 
excluded in the population as: 
 𝐻 =
𝑞
𝑛
, (4.1) 
where 𝑞 is the number of excluded people and 𝑛 is the total population. The intensity of 
financial exclusion, 𝐴, reflects the proportion of the weighted component indicators in 
which, on average, people are deprived. A is measured as: 
 𝐴 =
∑ 𝑐𝑖
𝑞
𝑖
𝑞
 (4.2) 
where 𝑐𝑖 is the deprivation score that the 𝑖th excluded individual experiences. 
As with the MPI, the value of the financial exclusion index is therefore the product of 
the headcount ratio and the intensity of financial exclusion, which means that the MFEI 
is given by: 
                                                 
23 A 50 per cent cut-off is chosen for consistency between this measure and the MPI. Basically, there are 
four dimensions of financial inclusion/exclusion: transactions and payments, savings, credit and insurance. 
Each dimension is treated equally because they each form an equal component of a household’s basic 
need for finance. If half of these components are not met, then the household is excluded. 
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 𝑀𝐹𝐸𝐼 = 𝐻 × 𝐴 (4.3) 
To assess which components are driving financial exclusion, the contribution of 
dimension 𝑗 to multidimensional financial exclusion can be calculated as: 
 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑏𝑗 =
∑ 𝑐𝑖𝑗
𝑞
1
𝑛
/𝑀𝐹𝐸𝐼. (4.4) 
Calculating the contribution of each dimension to multidimensional financial exclusion 
provides information that can be useful for revealing a country’s configuration of 
deprivations, and it can help with policy targeting. Table 4.1 summarises each indicator 
and its weight. Following Alkire and Foster (2010), this chapter uses equal weights for 
each indicator. 
Table 4.1: Dimensions, indicators, deprivation thresholds and weights for MFEI 
Dimension (weight) Indicator (weight) Deprived if… 
Transaction Checking account 
Household has no checking account 
(1/4) (1/4) 
Saving 
(1/4) 
Debt 
Household has no term deposits or bonds 
(1/8) 
Equity 
Household has no stock trading account 
(1/8) 
Credit 
(1/4) 
Loan 
Household has no mortgage or car loan 
(1/8) 
Credit card 
Household has no credit card 
(1/8) 
Insurance 
(1/4) 
Commercial insurance 
Household has no commercial insurance 
(1/4) 
4.4 Empirical exercise 
To showcase the MFEI, this chapter uses data from the China Household Finance 
Survey (CHFS), which is a nationally representative survey compiled by the South-
Western University of Finance and Economics (SWUFE) in 2011. The CHFS collects 
micro-level financial information about Chinese households, such as household income 
and wealth, assets and liabilities, expenditures, social security and commercial 
insurance, employment status and payment habits. The first wave of the survey was 
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conducted in July and August 2011 on 29,500 individuals in 8,438 households located 
in 320 communities across 25 Chinese provinces.24 
The MFEI is constructed as follows. Transactions and payments are captured with a 
variable that asks respondents to identify whether the household currently has a 
renminbi (RMB)-denominated checking account. Savings is captured with questions 
that ask respondents whether the household has an outstanding RMB time deposit or a 
stock trading account. Credit is measured using three questions to shed light on a 
household’s access to this dimension: (1) ‘Has your family borrowed money to 
purchase, improve, remodel or expand your home?’; (2) ‘Did your family take a bank 
loan to buy a car?’; and (3) ‘Does your family have a credit card?’ Finally, insurance is 
captured with a question that asks respondents whether they have access to insurance 
services. 
Table 4.2: MFEI by gender, ethnicity and location 
  MFEI H A Moderate1 Severe2 
Overall 
Value (%) (%) (%) (%) 
0.3925 53.32 73.61 36.19 3.06 
Gender 
Male 0.3943 53.53 73.65 36.44 2.99 
Female 0.3865 52.61 73.46 35.36 3.29 
Ethnicity 
Han-Chinese 0.3902 53.01 73.61 35.92 3.09 
Other Chinese 0.4759 64.62 73.64 45.83 1.76 
Rural–Urban 
Rural 0.4685 63.28 74.03 43.86 2.99 
Urban 0.3289 44.99 73.11 29.77 3.12 
Region 
East 0.3529 48.17 73.27 32.19 3.10 
Central 0.3957 53.38 74.13 36.84 2.72 
West 0.4688 63.88 73.38 43.33 3.55 
Source: Author’s calculations using data from CHFS 2011 
Notes: 1 Percentage of the population at risk of suffering multiple deprivations—that is, those with a 
deprivation score of 51–75 per cent. 2 Percentage of the population in severe multidimensional financial 
exclusion—that is, those with a deprivation score of 76 per cent or more. 
Table 4.2 summarises the key findings for the whole country according to demographic 
factors such as location and gender of the household head. Generally, the value of the 
MFEI is 0.3925, which means that approximately 39.25 per cent of respondents are 
                                                 
24 See Gan et al. (2013) for a detailed description of this data set. Following convention, this chapter uses 
the demographics of the household head to represent the household. 
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multidimensionally excluded from financial services. To put this into perspective, 
according to macroeconomic indicators such as M2/GDP, China is relatively more 
financially developed than the average developing economy in East Asia and the 
Pacific.25 However, approximately 40 per cent of Chinese households sampled can be 
defined as excluded from the financial services available in their country. Comparing 
MFEI measures with other macro-level indicators across the developing world is the 
subject of future work. 
Following the MPI definition, MFEI-excluded households are deprived in at least all the 
indicators of a single dimension or in a combination across dimensions, such as being in 
a household with no transaction account, credit card and insurance. In this case, 
excluded households are deprived in approximately 74 per cent of the weighted 
indicators. Importantly, Table 4.2 shows that there are no significant differences 
between men and women, suggesting that gender does not play a key role in 
determining financial exclusion in China.26  In contrast, ethnicity is associated with 
differences in exclusion. Ethnic Han Chinese—the largest ethnic group—are less likely 
to be multidimensionally excluded than other ethnicities. However, this may be related 
to Han Chinese predominating in cities, while other ethnicities predominantly live in 
rural areas.27 Indeed, the value of MFEI is higher in rural than in urban areas (46 versus 
33 per cent). Further, and not surprisingly, the MFEI is lower in the more developed 
Eastern China regions, where export-oriented growth has fully taken hold, compared 
with Western and Central China. 
As shown in Figure 4.1, regional inequality within China is clearly associated with 
financial exclusion. Households in rural areas are significantly less likely to access 
financial services, which makes them less able to smooth consumption over time. This 
is particularly problematic for rural farmers, who are often subject to price and 
environmental shocks. Programmes that aim to increase access—in particular, by 
increasing financial literacy among rural individuals—may prove useful (Cai, De 
                                                 
25 Using an average value from 1960 to 2015, M2/GDP in China is 105 per cent compared with 93 per 
cent in the rest of developing East Asia. 
26 It is plausible that this high level of equity in financial access stems from the closing gap in gender 
inequality both in the labour market and in education (Chen, Ge, Lai, & Wan, 2013; Zeng, Pang, Zhang, 
Medina, & Rozelle, 2014). The assumption here is that better-educated and paid women are more likely 
to demand, understand and access various financial services available in their communities. 
27 The data set shows that 62 per cent of Han Chinese live in cities compared with 52 per cent of people 
belonging to other ethnicities. 
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Janvry, & Sadoulet, 2015). Figure 4.1 summarises and reinforces these findings at the 
province level. 
Figure 4.1: MFEI by Chinese province (2011) 
Source: Author’s calculations using data from CHFS 2011 
Further, this chapter plots each province’s GDP per capita against province-level MFEI 
in Figure 4.2.28 Similar patterns emerge in Figure 4.2 as in Figure 4.1. Overall, rich 
provinces such as Beijing and Shanghai have lower values of the MFEI, while poorer 
provinces such as Gansu and Chongqing exhibit higher values of the index. This may be 
because rich provinces tend to have more financial services or financial integration, 
thereby raising GDP per capita. This issue is discussed in more detail in Chapter 5. 
28 See Appendix 4.1 for the date set. 
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Figure 4.2: GDP per capita (RMB) by Chinese province (2011) 
Source: National Bureau of Statistics of China (NBSC). 
Notes: For ease of exposition, GDP per capita for provinces with no MFEI are dropped. 
In addition to location and gender, other potentially obvious determinants of financial 
exclusion are age and education. Figure 4.3 plots values for the MFEI by age. The 
figure, which is plotted for household heads aged 18 and over, highlights that financial 
exclusion is lowest among younger individuals and increases at almost a constant rate as 
people get older. This may be because of the uptake of fintech services, which are more 
popular among younger and richer users (Mittal & Lloyd, 2016). This finding is 
consistent with the data from Alipay, which is the largest online payment platform in 
China. Alipay integrates a wide variety of services, including financial services (e.g., 
transactions and payments, deposits, loans, insurance) and everyday payment services 
(e.g., utility bills, supermarkets, ticket bookings). According to the 2011 Alipay Annual 
Report, approximately 59 per cent of its users are under the age of 31, and 23 per cent 
are under the age of 41, while most online shopping users are from the richer eastern 
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provinces. 29  Government programs that focus on increasing financial literacy and 
inclusion, as well as fintech uptake among older individuals, may help to bridge these 
gaps. 
Figure 4.3: MFEI by age (2011) 
Source: Author’s calculations using data from CHFS 2011 
Figure 4.4 shows that educational attainment is another important driver of financial 
exclusion in China. The figure shows that 46 per cent of individuals with only primary 
education are excluded, compared with 33 per cent of those with high school education 
and 24 per cent of those with tertiary qualifications. This suggests that, all else being 
equal, greater educational attainment is likely to increase understanding and usage of 
financial services. 
29 The original report is not available. See Zhejiang News: http://zjnews.zjol.com.cn/system/2012/01/10/ 
018134006.shtml. 
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Figure 4.4: MFEI by level of educational attainment 
Source: Author’s calculations using data from CHFS 2011 
Finally, policy formulation requires an indication of which component of the MFEI is 
more likely to drive financial exclusion within provinces. Figure 4.5 shows that 
excluded households generally lack access to credit, transaction and savings products. 
This suggests that deprived households lack the mechanisms necessary to smooth 
consumption over time. Importantly, the data also reveal that deprived households in 
China are better prepared to deal with shocks through insurance channels. 
Figure 4.5: Drivers of financial exclusion in China (2011) 
Source: Author’s calculations using data from CHFS 2011 
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4.5 Conclusion 
Students who are exposed to simple microeconomic theory learn how financial services 
allow people to forego consumption in the present to increase consumption in the 
future, or vice versa, while simultaneously purchasing insurance against various shocks. 
Consequently, understanding the wide array of benefits of financial integration is 
intuitively straightforward. However, measuring financial development, integration, 
exclusion and inclusion remains a widely debated issue. This chapter aims to contribute 
to this debate with a simple micro-based index of financial exclusion. The aim is to use 
this index to complement existing macro-level indicators to understand both the state of 
financial development in a country and the uptake of financial services within it. 
Borrowing from the formulas used to construct the MPI, this chapter uses a national 
representative household finance survey of more than 8,000 Chinese households to 
construct an MFEI. The index captures the multidimensional nature of financial 
exclusion by identifying multiple deprivations at the household level in four 
dimensions: transaction, saving, credit and insurance. 
To inform policy, this chapter also measures the index for various demographic groups. 
This allows scholars to uncover interesting aspects about financial exclusion in China—
for example, that the gender of the household head is unlikely to play a role in 
determining access to financial services. However, education, ethnicity and age are 
likely to play significant roles. Importantly, the rise of fintech in China is likely to 
provide new and exciting opportunities to bridge these gaps. However, success will 
require that these technologies are made available to segments of the population that are 
perhaps unfamiliar with smart-phone applications—namely, older people with lower 
levels of education, particularly in rural areas. Policies aimed at promoting 
inclusiveness and access to financial services need to consider these factors. 
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Appendix 4.1 
MFEI and GDP per capita by Chinese provinces (2011) 
Province MFEI 
GDP per capita 
(RMB) 
Province MFEI 
GDP per capita 
(RMB) 
Chongqing 0.5556 34,500 Henan 0.4106 28,661 
Heilongjiang 0.4914 32,819 Liaoning 0.3933 50,760 
Jiangsu 0.472 62,290 Shandong 0.367 47,335 
Gansu 0.4657 19,595 Guangdong 0.3176 50,807 
Shanxi 0.4601 31,357 Hunan 0.3076 29,880 
Sichuan 0.4501 26,133 Zhejiang 0.303 59,249 
Jilin 0.4477 38,460 Shanghai 0.2934 82,560 
Anhui 0.4466 25,659 Tianjin 0.2732 85,213 
Hebei 0.4442 33,969 Jiangxi 0.2703 26,150 
Hubei 0.4277 34,197 Beijing 0.1915 81,658 
Yunnan 0.4178 19,265 
Correlation coefficient −0.688*** 
Sources: MFEI is the author’s own calculations using data from CHFS 2011. GDP per capita are 
collected from the National Bureau of Statistics in China. 
Note: *** represents significance at the 1% level. 
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Chapter 5: Does Financial Inclusion Increase Household 
Income?30 
Financial inclusion is positioned prominently as an enabler of other developmental 
goals in the 2030 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), where it is featured as a 
target in eight of the seventeen goals. These include SDG1, on eradicating poverty… 
United Nations Capital Development Fund and SDGs31 
This chapter contributes to the literature by focusing on household income to determine 
whether financial inclusion can help to improve people’s lives. The analysis highlights 
how household characteristics, combined with financial inclusion, affect household 
income at the microeconomic level. Using a national representative household finance 
survey data from China, this chapter examines the effect of financial inclusion on 
household income. It adopts a series of robustness measures to test the sensitivity of the 
results. The analysis of the effect of financial inclusion on household income elicits 
several findings. First, financial inclusion has a strong positive effect on household 
income. This effect can be found across all households with different levels of income. 
Second, as household income increases, this effect becomes weaker. This means that 
low-income households benefit more from financial inclusion. In this sense, financial 
inclusion should help to reduce income inequality. 
The rest of this chapter is organised as follows. Section 5.1 introduces the topic and 
reviews the relevant literature. Section 5.2 describes the data and the model. Section 5.3 
explains the empirical strategy, and Section 5.4 presents the results from the empirical 
analysis undertaken. Section 5.5 presents some discussions, and Section 5.6 concludes. 
5.1 Introduction 
Financial inclusion occurs when households, regardless of income level, have access to 
a wide range of financial services that they need to improve their lives (Dev, 2006). 
When people participate in the financial system, they are better able to invest in 
education, start and expand their businesses, manage risks and absorb financial shocks 
                                                 
30 Part of Chapter 5 has been published: Zhang, Q., & Posso, A. (2017). Thinking inside the box: A closer 
look at financial inclusion and household income. Journal of Development Studies, 1–16. 
31 http://www.uncdf.org/financial-inclusion-and-the-sdgs 
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(Bruhn & Love, 2014; Burgess, Pande, & Wong, 2005; Dev, 2006; Dupas & Robinson, 
2013). Specifically, field experiments show that: (1) access to transaction and saving 
accounts and payment facilities increases savings, empowers women and encourages 
investment and consumption (Ashraf, Karlan, & Yin, 2010; Dupas & Robinson, 2013); 
(2) access to credit positively affects consumption, as well as employment status, 
income and mental health (Angelucci, Karlan, & Zinman, 2013; Banerjee, Duflo, 
Glennerster, & Kinnan, 2015; Karlan, McConnell, Mullainathan, & Zinman, 2016); and 
(3) access to insurance encourages riskier agricultural practice, increases income and 
reduces truancy (Cole et al., 2013; Karlan, Osei, Osei-Akoto, & Udry, 2014). 
Informed by this growing evidence, policymakers and regulators in both developing and 
developed countries are undertaking initiatives to prioritise financial inclusion and 
financial sector development. These policies include legislative measures (e.g., the 
‘Financial Inclusion Task Force’, 2005, in the UK), banking sector initiatives (e.g., the 
‘Mzansi’ account of South Africa) and establishing alternative financial institutions 
(e.g., microfinance). Globally, the World Bank declared its strategic plan of achieving 
universal financial access by 2020,32 given that an estimated two billion adults (38 per 
cent) worldwide do not have a basic account (Demirgüç-Kunt et al., 2015). 
Despite this popularity, a fundamental question remains unanswered: Does financial 
inclusion improve people’s lives? Very few empirical studies have investigated this 
question. Chibba (2009) presented a qualitative review of a series of case studies from 
across the developing world and concluded that the rising availability of financial 
institutions seems to be an important conduit for inclusive development and poverty 
reduction. Using an index of ﬁnancial inclusion for 49 countries, Sarma (2008) and 
Sarma and Pais (2011) described a broad relationship between ﬁnancial inclusion and 
human development. They found that income inequality is an important determinant in 
explaining the level of ﬁnancial inclusion in a country. This finding strengthens the 
assertion that ﬁnancial exclusion is a reflection of social exclusion, because countries 
with relatively higher levels of income inequality seem to be less financially inclusive. 
Similarly, using their own financial inclusion indicator for 37 developing Asian 
economies, Park and Mercado Jr (2015) tested the effect of financial inclusion on 
poverty and income inequality. They found that financial inclusion significantly reduces 
                                                 
32 For details of the World Bank’s Universal Financial Access 2020, see http://www.worldbank.org/en/ 
topic/financialinclusion/brief/achieving-universal-financial-access-by-2020. 
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both measures. Other studies have used microfinance as a proxy for financial 
development to study the relationship between this variable and other macroeconomic 
indicators such as poverty, income and gender inequality, child health and education 
(Dev, 2006; Zhang, 2017; Zhang & Posso, 2017). 
However, there are two main drawbacks to these studies. First, financial inclusion, 
financial development and microfinance are different concepts. Microfinance serves to 
promote financial inclusion: it is a means rather than the goal. Similarly, financial 
development is essentially an input variable because it refers to the establishment of 
institutions that facilitate transactions by extending credit (World Bank, 2015). In 
contrast, financial inclusion is characterised by households and businesses using 
financial services (World Bank, 2015). Second, previous studies have focused on the 
effect of financial development at the macroeconomic level. Macroeconomic studies are 
useful at determining the overall effect of financial development or inclusion on a 
country. However, they cannot shed light on how individuals or households experience 
the effects of inclusion within their community. 
5.2 Data and model 
The cross-sectional data set used in this chapter is obtained from the CHFS, which is a 
nationally representative data set compiled by the SWUFE in 2011. The data set 
includes information about household income and wealth, assets and liabilities, 
expenditures, social security and commercial insurance, demographics, employment 
status and payment habits. The survey was conducted with 29,500 individuals in 8,438 
households located in 320 communities across 25 Chinese provinces.33 
The empirical specification is given as: 
 𝑦𝑖 = 𝛽𝐹𝑖 + 𝛾𝑋𝑖 + 𝛼𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖 (5.1) 
where 𝑦𝑖 represents the dependent variables, which refer to the income for household 𝑖, 
while 𝑋𝑖  is a vector of control variables that have been previously found to explain 
movements in household income. 
                                                 
33 Here, 359 household observations (4.24% of the total sample) with negative, zero or extremely low 
gross annual income are dropped. Other restrictions on the sample occur because of the availability of 
important covariates. See Gan et al. (2013) for a detailed description of this data set. 
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These variables include family size (members), age, gender, marriage (married and 
others), education, political status (communist, non-communist and youth league, with 
an omitted category being others),34 ethnicity (Han Chinese and minorities), Hukou, 
rural–urban, number of houses, agriculture (if the household engages in agriculture 
production), business (if the household engages in the production of industrial and 
commercial projects), proportion of children, proportion of old and proportion of 
employed. 35  The variable, 𝛼𝑖 , is a province-level dummy variable that controls for 
unobserved time-invariant characteristics such as geographical location (mountainous or 
seaside). Finally, 𝜀𝑖𝑡 is a normally distributed mean-zero error term. 
The variable, 𝐹𝑖 , is defined as a binary variable that is equal to 1 if a household is 
financially excluded or deprived. Specifically, to compute 𝐹𝑖  , this chapter assigns each 
person a deprivation score according to their household’s deprivations in each of the six 
component indicators described in Table 4.1. The maximum deprivation score is 
100 per cent when each dimension is equally weighted. Thus, the maximum deprivation 
score in each dimension is 25 per cent. The dimensions of both savings and access to 
credit have two indicators, so each indicator is worth 25/2, or 12.50 per cent. To show 
the extent of financial inclusion, the deprivation scores for each indicator are summed to 
obtain the household deprivation score. A cut-off of 50 per cent, which is equivalent to 
half of the weighted indicators, is used to distinguish between financially excluded and 
included households. If the household deprivation score is higher than 50 per cent, that 
household (and everyone in it) is financially excluded, and vice versa.36 In robustness 
exercises, an alternative cut-off value of 75 per cent is used. 
In contrast to macroeconomic indices of financial inclusion, such as Ang (2009) and 
Massara and Mialou (2014), the advantage of 𝐹𝑖 is obvious. It captures individual- or 
                                                 
34 In addition to the Communist Party, China has eight non-communist parties, including the China 
Democratic League, the China Democratic National Construction Association and the China Association 
for Promoting Democracy. These parties are under the leadership of the Communist Party. The 
Communist Youth League of China, also known as the Youth League, is a youth movement run by the 
Communist Party for youths between the ages of 14 and 28. 
35 This chapter controls for Hukou, rural–urban and agriculture simultaneously. Before Chinese reform 
and opening in 1978, the Hukou system was introduced mainly to control for population mobility caused 
by food shortages. Those who grow food by themselves are classified as agricultural Hukou, and those 
whose food is distributed by the government are classified as non-agricultural Hukou. Households with 
non-agricultural Hukou may live in a rural area, and they may or may not engage in agricultural 
production. Here, agricultural production includes agriculture, forestry, animal husbandry and aquaculture. 
36 As mentioned in Chapter 4, a cut-off of 50 per cent is chosen for consistency between this measure and 
the MPI. Each dimension is treated equally because they each form an equal component of a household’s 
basic need for finance. If half of those components are not met, then the household is excluded. 
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household-level determinants of access and other idiosyncrasies within and between 
countries. This can benefit stakeholders and policymakers by shedding light on which 
individual- or household-level characteristics determine or prevent the uptake of 
financial services, in areas where these services are available, at the macroeconomic 
level. As with its macro-level counterpart, the micro-level indicator also summarises the 
complex nature of financial inclusion, but at the household level. 
5.3 Empirical strategy 
This chapter first applies OLS to examine the effect of financial exclusion on household 
income, which gives the baseline results. However, OLS provides only a partial view of 
the relationship, and one may be interested in describing the relationship at different 
points in the conditional distribution of income. Thus, QR is used, which enables 
scholars to study the effect of predictors on different quantiles of the response 
distribution; thus, it provides a more complete picture of the relationship between the 
variables of interest. 
Additionally, it is possible that Equation (5.1) suffers from an endogeneity problem. 
The hypothesis here is that financial inclusion leads to more income-earning 
opportunities. However, an increase in income could potentially allow households to 
gain access to financial services and become financially included. To address this 
potential problem, this chapter takes advantage of the fact that 𝐹𝑖 is a binary variable, 
and it applies Rosenbaum and Rubin’s (1983) PSM technique in its estimation. PSM 
allows for the estimation of financial inclusion on earnings. Ideally, the research would 
like to observe the earnings of financially included individuals if they were not included 
and then compute the gain in earnings. However, we can never see the counterfactual 
outcome. PSM addresses this problem by forming two groups according to the 
treatment variable: treated group (financially excluded) and control group (financially 
included). For every subject in the treated group, researchers find a comparable subject 
in the control group. Comparing the two groups, we then can get an estimate of the 
effects of financial inclusion/exclusion on earning. In this chapter, 𝐹𝑖  is a binary 
variable, I set it as the treatment variable. There are four steps in PSM: (1) determine 
observational covariates and estimate the propensity scores; (2) balance the sample 
based on the estimated scores; (3) calculate the treatment effect by selecting appropriate 
methods such as matching and covariates/regression adjustment; and (4) conduct 
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sensitivity tests to determine whether the estimated average treatment effect (ATT) on 
the treated variable is robust. Caliendo and Kopeinig (2008) found that there are 
advantages and disadvantages of using different matching algorithms when computing 
PSM. Therefore, this chapter employs multiple algorithms—namely, nearest-neighbour, 
kernel, radius and local linear regression matching methods—to test the required 
assumptions of PSM. 
Additionally, as a robustness exercise, this chapter uses a new method of counterfactual 
decomposition to investigate the degree to which financial inclusion affects household 
income. Proposed by Machado and Mata (2005), this method decomposes the changes 
in income distribution into several factors that contribute to those changes—namely, by 
discriminating between changes in the characteristics of the working population and 
changes in the returns to these characteristics. Consequently, this chapter decomposes 
the difference of household income between two types of households: financially 
included (𝐹𝑖 =0) and financially excluded (𝐹𝑖 =1). Here, Effects of Characteristics 
measures the extent to which differences in income across quintiles are driven by 
household characteristics rather than financial exclusion, while Effects of Coefficients 
measures the extent to which financial exclusion, rather than other household 
characteristics, contributes to differences in household income.37 Table 5.1 presents the 
summary statistics and detailed variable definitions. 
                                                 
37 See Machado and Mata (2005) for more details. 
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Table 5.1: Descriptive statistics 
Variable Obs. Mean Std Dev. Min. Max. Explanation 
𝐹𝑖 (Financial inclusion) 6,263 0.520 0.500 0 1 Binary: whether a household deprivation score of financial inclusion is above 50 
Deprivation score 6,263 59.58 16.48 12.50 100 Household deprivation score of financial inclusion (0–100) 
Transaction 8,052 0.429 0.495 0 1 Binary: whether household has a checking account 
Debt 8,038 0.817 0.387 0 1 Binary: whether household has a term deposit or bond 
Equity 8,073 0.910 0.286 0 1 Binary: whether household has a stock trading account 
Loan 7,369 0.894 0.307 0 1 Binary: whether household has a mortgage or car loan 
Credit card 7,377 0.939 0.239 0 1 Binary: whether household has a credit card 
Commercial insurance 7,558 0.141 0.348 0 1 Binary: whether household has commercial insurance 
Income (log) 8,079 10.13 1.319 4.605 14.91 Household income (log) 
Family size 8,079 3.493 1.549 1 18 Number of family members 
Gender 8,079 0.734 0.442 0 1 Binary: whether household is male-headed 
Age 8,078 49.98 14.02 4 111 Household head age 
Hukou 8,079 0.527 0.499 0 1 Binary: whether household has an agricultural residence permit (agriculture Hukou) 
Rural 8,079 0.388 0.487 0 1 Binary: whether household lives in a rural area 
Ethnicity 8,079 0.902 0.298 0 1 Binary: whether household is Han Chinese 
Marriage 7,997 0.876 0.330 0 1 Binary: whether household head is married 
Number of houses 7,360 1.185 0.490 1 15 Number of houses household has 
Children 8,079 0.118 0.159 0 0.750 Proportion of children in the household (younger than 15) 
Old 8,079 0.142 0.291 0 1 Proportion of old people in the household (older than 65) 
Employed 8,079 0.541 0.319 0 1 Proportion of employed people in the household 
Agriculture 8,077 0.366 0.482 0 1 Binary: whether household engages in agriculture production 
Business 8,077 0.133 0.340 0 1 Binary: whether household engages in production of industrial and commercial 
projects 
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Variable Obs. Mean Std Dev. Min. Max. Explanation 
Education 8004 2.211 1.046 1 4 Categorical: highest education level in the household (1 = never attended 
school…9 = PhD) 
Primary education 8,004 0.306 0.461 0 1 Binary: whether the highest education level of the household head is ‘never attended 
school’ or ‘primary school’ (baseline group) 
Junior high education 8,004 0.333 0.471 0 1 Binary: whether the highest education level of the household head is junior high 
school 
Senior high education 8,004 0.202 0.402 0 1 Binary: whether the highest education level of the household head is senior high 
school or secondary school 
College education 8,004 0.158 0.364 0 1 Binary: whether the highest education level of the household head is 
college/vocational, undergraduate, master or PhD 
Political affiliation 7501 3.525 0.920 1 4 Categorical: political status of the household head (1 = Youth League, 2 = Communist 
Party, 3 = non-Communist Party, 4 = public citizen [the masses]) 
Public citizen 7,501 0.782 0.413 0 1 Binary: whether the political status of the household head is a public citizen (the 
masses) (baseline group) 
Youth League 7,501 0.0420 0.201 0 1 Binary: whether the political status of the household head is Youth League 
Communist Party 7,501 0.173 0.378 0 1 Binary: whether the political status of the household head is Communist Party 
Non-Communist Party 7,501 0.00347 0.0588 0 1 Binary: whether the political status of the household head is non-Communist Party 
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5.4 Empirical results 
5.4.1 Ordinary least squares and quantile regressions 
Table 5.2 presents the results of estimating Equation (5.1) using OLS and QR. For ease 
of exposition, and given that most of the coefficient estimates meet prior expectations, 
the table only reports a selection of coefficient estimates. Column (1) presents the 
results from OLS, while columns (2)–(10) display the results from QR. In all 
estimations, this chapter uses robust standard errors to control for potential 
heteroscedasticity. 
Turning first to the relationship between 𝐹𝑖  and income, column (1) shows that 
financially excluded households have less income. This confirms the relationship 
discussed previously and is consistent with findings in macroeconomic studies (Bruhn 
& Love, 2014; Burgess et al., 2005; Dev, 2006; Dupas & Robinson, 2013). Moreover, 
its effect seems to be relatively large: the coefficient estimate shows that household 
income is approximately 36 per cent lower for excluded households. 
As previously discussed, standard linear regressions only provide a summary of the 
average of the distribution corresponding to the set of independent variables. Therefore, 
this chapter employs QR, which computes various percentage points of the 
distributions, thereby offering a more complete picture. Columns (2)–(10) in Table 5.2 
present the results from the 10th to the 90th quantiles. They show that financial 
inclusion has a larger effect on the lower quantiles of household income. The 10th, 20th, 
30th and 40th quantiles of income of financially excluded households are 57, 49, 40 and 
38 per cent lower than those of financially included households, respectively. Figure 5.1 
plots the relationship between financial exclusion and household income by quantile, 
with 95 per cent confidence interval bands. 
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Table 5.2: Results from OLS and QR for the estimation of household income—financial inclusion relationship 
 Dependent variable: household income (log) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
 OLS Q_10 Q_20 Q_30 Q_40 Q_50 Q_60 Q_70 Q_80 Q_90 
𝐹𝑖   −0.31*** −0.45*** −0.40*** −0.34*** −0.32*** −0.28*** −0.24*** −0.20*** −0.19*** −0.16*** 
 [−11.2] [−5.89] [−8.45] [−10.2] [−10.8] [−10.4] [−9.53] [−8.52] [−7.55] [−4.97] 
Gender −0.00023 0.078 0.020 0.013 0.040 −0.014 −0.013 −0.036 −0.011 −0.016 
 [−0.0069] [0.96] [0.35] [0.36] [1.12] [−0.46] [−0.45] [−1.28] [−0.36] [−0.44] 
Age −0.0019 0.0052 0.0011 −0.0026 −0.0025 −0.0028* −0.0024* −0.0032** −0.0039*** −0.0054*** 
 [−1.26] [1.56] [0.47] [−1.62] [−1.54] [−1.91] [−1.70] [−2.38] [−2.59] [−2.98] 
Marriage 0.34*** 0.35*** 0.36*** 0.31*** 0.32*** 0.36*** 0.32*** 0.30*** 0.30*** 0.27*** 
 [6.90] [3.14] [3.91] [5.67] [6.54] [8.05] [6.76] [7.25] [7.44] [5.24] 
Ethnicity 0.057 0.40** 0.25 0.056 0.038 −0.0095 −0.024 −0.068 −0.13 −0.0064 
 [0.61] [2.45] [1.58] [0.35] [0.38] [−0.11] [−0.33] [−0.88] [−1.47] [−0.096] 
Family size 0.14*** 0.12*** 0.13*** 0.15*** 0.16*** 0.15*** 0.15*** 0.16*** 0.15*** 0.13*** 
 [11.1] [3.95] [7.09] [11.6] [14.1] [13.9] [14.2] [13.5] [14.1] [8.86] 
Hukou −0.45*** −0.67*** −0.49*** −0.43*** −0.37*** −0.36*** −0.32*** −0.28*** −0.31*** −0.33*** 
 [−9.45] [−4.30] [−6.59] [−9.28] [−8.42] [−8.83] [−8.41] [−6.45] [−7.10] [−5.87] 
Rural −0.26*** −0.38*** −0.41*** −0.31*** −0.28*** −0.23*** −0.21*** −0.17*** −0.15*** −0.11** 
 [−6.20] [−3.45] [−6.04] [−6.11] [−6.16] [−6.30] [−5.89] [−4.64] [−3.80] [−2.23] 
Number of houses 0.25*** 0.23*** 0.23*** 0.21*** 0.21*** 0.21*** 0.20*** 0.23*** 0.27*** 0.33*** 
 [7.56] [2.93] [12.3] [12.6] [5.40] [5.89] [6.47] [5.89] [6.55] [6.53] 
Children −0.19* −0.20 −0.015 −0.22** −0.25** −0.26*** −0.25*** −0.32*** −0.29*** −0.24* 
 [−1.77] [−0.90] [−0.078] [−1.97] [−2.29] [−2.64] [−2.65] [−3.63] [−2.99] [−1.69] 
Old −0.14** −0.33** −0.23** −0.19** −0.091 −0.061 −0.038 −0.0071 0.085 0.074 
 [−2.21] [−2.57] [−2.01] [−2.28] [−1.38] [−0.98] [−0.70] [−0.12] [1.38] [1.17] 
Employed 0.56*** 0.63*** 0.64*** 0.49*** 0.47*** 0.47*** 0.43*** 0.40*** 0.48*** 0.46*** 
 [9.58] [5.25] [6.32] [7.50] [8.35] [9.24] [9.01] [7.74] [8.45] [6.98] 
Agriculture 0.17*** 0.57*** 0.14* 0.038 −0.020 −0.0070 −0.020 −0.047 −0.079* −0.064 
 [3.39] [4.56] [1.71] [0.61] [−0.36] [−0.16] [−0.49] [−1.13] [−1.89] [−1.12] 
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 Dependent variable: household income (log) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
 OLS Q_10 Q_20 Q_30 Q_40 Q_50 Q_60 Q_70 Q_80 Q_90 
Business 0.33*** 0.14 0.16* 0.23*** 0.23*** 0.26*** 0.30*** 0.32*** 0.40*** 0.49*** 
 [7.03] [1.12] [1.67] [4.36] [5.43] [5.68] [7.34] [6.94] [9.19] [6.27] 
Youth League −0.041 −0.56** −0.065 −0.048 0.035 0.033 0.073 0.058 0.077 0.071 
 [−0.47] [−2.30] [−0.48] [−0.60] [0.45] [0.44] [0.84] [0.86] [0.82] [1.06] 
Communist Party 0.30*** 0.29*** 0.30*** 0.33*** 0.31*** 0.27*** 0.23*** 0.23*** 0.21*** 0.19*** 
 [7.95] [2.71] [5.22] [7.13] [8.33] [7.84] [7.37] [7.09] [5.70] [4.76] 
Non-Communist Party 0.15 0.074 0.019 0.27 0.22 0.29 0.34 0.29** 0.26 0.039 
 [0.67] [0.23] [0.030] [0.93] [1.31] [0.84] [1.04] [2.03] [1.14] [0.37] 
Junior high education 0.31*** 0.55*** 0.46*** 0.41*** 0.31*** 0.25*** 0.25*** 0.22*** 0.21*** 0.18*** 
 [8.77] [6.08] [7.44] [8.86] [7.25] [6.98] [7.24] [6.73] [6.54] [5.09] 
Senior high education 0.39*** 0.59*** 0.50*** 0.45*** 0.39*** 0.36*** 0.35*** 0.33*** 0.30*** 0.29*** 
 [8.43] [4.74] [6.35] [7.68] [7.28] [7.93] [8.73] [8.44] [8.02] [6.92] 
College education 0.80*** 1.27*** 0.86*** 0.74*** 0.64*** 0.61*** 0.61*** 0.59*** 0.61*** 0.71*** 
 [13.8] [8.83] [9.62] [11.2] [10.3] [10.4] [12.0] [11.7] [9.93] [11.0] 
Constant 9.23*** 7.58*** 8.44*** 9.27*** 9.36*** 9.64*** 9.81*** 10.0*** 10.2*** 10.3*** 
 [49.8] [22.7] [27.7] [46.1] [52.8] [65.3] [72.5] [63.5] [62.8] [71.9] 
Province fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 6,195 6,195 6,195 6,195 6,195 6,195 6,195 6,195 6,195 6,195 
R-squared 0.30 0.26 0.29 0.30 0.30 0.30 0.29 0.29 0.28 0.27 
Notes: Q_10 to Q_90 represent quantiles from 10 to 90. Numbers in square brackets are robust t-values. The table shows the results of OLS and QR using a binary variable 𝐹𝑖 
for financial inclusion. 𝐹𝑖 equals 1 if the household deprivation score is higher than 50 per cent and 0 otherwise. ***, ** and * represent significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% 
levels, respectively. 
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Figure 5.1: Quantile plot 
5.4.2 Robustness test 
1. PSM
As discussed earlier, there is a potential endogeneity problem in the model. Following 
Gimenez-Nadal and Molina (2016), Strietholt, Bos, Gustafsson and Rosén (2014) and 
Lee (2013), this chapter undertakes PSM to address this issue. The key variable of 
interest, 𝐹𝑖 (financial inclusion), is binary; thus, it is set as the treatment variable. Using 
one-to-one matching, Table 5.3 shows the balancing of the variables before and after 
matching. 
After matching, all variables are well balanced, providing a bias of less than 5 per cent 
(%bias<5%). Moreover, because all t-tests are insignificant, the null hypothesis that 
there is no systematic difference between treatment and control groups cannot be 
rejected. Figure 5.2 shows the histogram of matched sub-samples along common 
support. It shows that most of the observations are on support. Therefore, the overall 
matching performance is deemed to be good. That is, one-to-one matching is effective 
in building a good control group. 
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Figure 5.2: Histogram of matched sub-samples along common support from PSM 
Following Caliendo and Kopeinig’s (2008) suggestion, this chapter performs PSM with 
multiple matching algorithms and obtains similar results to Table 5.3 and Figure 5.2. 
Most of the variables are well balanced (%bias<5%), with t-tests being insignificant. 
Therefore, it can be concluded that the required assumptions of PSM are satisfied. 
Table 5.4 summarises the results of the PSM. Using one-to-one matching, the ATT is 
−0.342 with a significance level at 1 per cent. This is close to the coefficient from OLS 
(−0.31). Further, in all other estimations, the ATT is close to the coefficient estimates 
from OLS (i.e., −0.31), with the same significance level at 1 per cent. For example, 
using the matching algorithm of radius gives an ATT of −0.34, meaning that household 
income will be roughly 40 per cent lower for households that are financially excluded 
than for households that are financially included. 
0 .2 .4 .6 .8 1
Propensity Score
Untreated: Off support Untreated: On support
Treated: On support Treated: Off support
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Table 5.3: PSM balancing using one-to-one matching 
  
Mean 
 
%reduction t-test 
Variable 
Unmatched/ 
Matched 
Treated Control %bias |bias| t p>|t| 
Gender U 0.751 0.748 0.700 
 
0.280 0.782 
 
M 0.753 0.758 −1.100 −53.50 −0.440 0.662 
Age U 52.00 50.27 12.90 
 
5.080 0 
 
M 51.92 51.73 1.400 89.10 0.580 0.563 
Marriage U 0.898 0.894 1.300 
 
0.520 0.606 
 
M 0.900 0.903 −1.100 13.80 −0.460 0.645 
Ethnicity U 0.971 0.977 −4.400 
 
−1.720 0.0850 
 
M 0.971 0.964 4.300 1.400 1.550 0.121 
Family size U 3.594 3.427 10.90 
 
4.270 0 
 
M 3.594 3.595 0 99.60 −0.0200 0.987 
Hukou U 0.672 0.470 41.80 
 
16.45 0 
 
M 0.671 0.676 −1.100 97.40 −0.450 0.650 
Rural U 0.523 0.330 39.80 
 
15.64 0 
 
M 0.520 0.518 0.300 99.20 0.130 0.900 
Number of houses U 1.120 1.192 −16.10 
 
−6.390 0 
 
M 1.121 1.129 −1.800 89 −0.860 0.391 
Children U 0.114 0.114 0.400 
 
0.160 0.872 
 
M 0.114 0.120 −3.900 −855.6 −1.560 0.119 
Old U 0.150 0.149 0.300 
 
0.120 0.901 
 
M 0.149 0.145 1.400 −351.8 0.580 0.563 
Employed U 0.569 0.516 16.60 
 
6.510 0 
 
M 0.569 0.567 0.800 95.20 0.320 0.752 
Agriculture U 0.506 0.319 38.60 
 
15.15 0 
 
M 0.504 0.509 −1.100 97.10 −0.430 0.671 
Business U 0.118 0.137 −5.900 
 
−2.330 0.0200 
 
M 0.119 0.120 −0.500 92.10 −0.190 0.847 
Youth League U 0.0314 0.0410 −5.200 
 
−2.040 0.0420 
 
M 0.0316 0.0332 −0.800 83.80 −0.350 0.724 
Communist Party U 0.124 0.201 −20.90 
 
−8.260 0 
 
M 0.125 0.132 −2 90.60 −0.860 0.390 
Non-Communist Party U 0.00466 0.00202 4.600 
 
1.790 0.0740 
 
M 0.00250 0.00219 0.500 88.20 0.260 0.796 
Junior high education U 0.362 0.350 2.500 
 
0.970 0.330 
 
M 0.364 0.350 2.900 −16.10 1.150 0.251 
Senior high education U 0.166 0.244 −19.30 
 
−7.610 0 
 
M 0.167 0.170 −0.700 96.40 −0.300 0.764 
College education U 0.0683 0.154 −27.50 
 
−10.89 0 
 
M 0.0685 0.0732 −1.500 94.50 −0.730 0.465 
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Table 5.4: Results from PSM using different matching method 
Matching method 
ATT (average treatment effect on the treated) 
Observed coefficient Standard error 
1. Nearest neighbour (one-to-one)  –0.342***  0.040 
4. Nearest neighbour –0.358*** 0.0367 
Radius –0.338*** 0.029 
Kernel 0.339*** 0.029 
Local linear regression –0.347*** 0.030 
Baseline result 
OLS –0.315*** 0.028 
Notes: Bootstrap standard errors with 200 replications. *** represents significance at the 1% level. 
2. M–M method 
The second approach—namely, the M–M method—which is used to test the robustness 
of the results, builds on Machado and Mata (2005).38 Table 5.5 confirms the previous 
results by showing that for the 10th to the 40th quantiles (of household income), the 
proportion of Effects of Coefficients is higher than that of Effects of Characteristics. 
This suggests that for low-income households, income differences are mainly driven by 
exclusion rather than other household characteristics. At the 50th, 60th and 70th 
quantiles, the two proportions are roughly equal. However, at the 80th and 90th 
quantiles, the proportion of Effects of Characteristics is higher than that of Effects of 
Coefficients. This indicates that for high-income households, income differences can be 
attributed to other household characteristics rather than financial inclusion. 
  
                                                 
38 This chapter uses Stata code cdeco provided by Melly (2005) to conduct counterfactual decomposition. 
To present the proportion of Effects of Characteristics and Effects of Coefficients in the differences of the 
household income between two kinds of households (𝐹𝑖 = 0 and 𝐹𝑖 = 1) and how this changes across 
different levels of household income intuitively and directly, Table 5.5 converts the effect of 
characteristics and coefficients into their percentage in total differences. For example, in the 10th quantile, 
the coefficient of the quantile effect (total differences) is 0.96. Using Machado and Mata’s (2005) method 
of counterfactual decomposition, 0.35 of 0.96 comes from the Effects of Characteristics, while the rest 
(0.60) comes from the Effects of Coefficients. Therefore, 0.35/0.96 = 36.50 per cent is the proportion of 
Effects of Characteristics in total differences, and 0.61/0.96 = 63.50 per cent is the proportion of Effects 
of Coefficients in total differences. 
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Table 5.5: Results from Machado and Mata’s (2005) method 
 Q_10 Q_20 Q_30 Q_40 Q_50 Q_60 Q_70 Q_80 Q_90 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Effects of Characteristics 36.50 39.28 37.93 47.96 50.20 49.30 50.26 56.72 53.89 
Effects of Coefficients 63.50 60.72 62.07 52.04 49.80 50.70 49.74 43.28 46.11 
Note: Q_10 to Q_90 represent quantiles from 10 to 90. 
Source: Author’s own calculations 
This exercise reveals two key findings. First, financial inclusion has a strong positive 
effect on household income. This effect can be found across all households with 
different levels of income. Second, as household income increases, this effect becomes 
weaker; that is, low-income households benefit more from financial inclusion than 
richer ones. Thus, financial inclusion can help to lower income inequality. 
3. Alternative cut-off 
To test the robustness of the model, an alternative cut-off of 75 per cent is used to 
distinguish between excluded and included households. If the household deprivation 
score is higher than 75 per cent, that household (and everyone in it) is financially 
excluded, and vice versa. 
Tables 5.6, 5.7 and 5.8 present the results of the OLS and QR, PSM, and Machado and 
Mata’s (2005) method of counterfactual decomposition, respectively. The tables show 
that the results are consistent with those presented in this chapter. 
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Table 5.6: Results from OLS and QR for the estimation of household income—financial inclusion relationship (75 per cent cut-off) 
 Dependent variable: household income (log) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
 
OLS Q_10 Q_20 Q_30 Q_40 Q_50 Q_60 Q_70 Q_80 Q_90 
𝐹𝑖   −0.33*** −0.45*** −0.40*** −0.36*** −0.34*** −0.32*** −0.28*** −0.25*** −0.24*** −0.22*** 
 [−11.4] [−6.22] [−8.04] [−9.60] [−10.9] [−12.0] [−10.9] [−9.92] [−8.29] [−6.67] 
Gender 0.0062 0.066 0.023 0.020 0.025 0.0078 0.0018 −0.033 −0.0068 −0.019 
 [0.18] [0.80] [0.42] [0.48] [0.70] [0.26] [0.060] [−1.15] [−0.21] [−0.51] 
Age −0.0017 0.0051 0.00084 −0.0021 −0.0018 −0.0026* −0.0022* −0.0030** −0.0041*** −0.0054*** 
 [−1.10] [1.37] [0.33] [−1.07] [−1.14] [−1.85] [−1.69] [−2.29] [−2.79] [−3.14] 
Marriage 0.33*** 0.37*** 0.34*** 0.30*** 0.32*** 0.34*** 0.32*** 0.30*** 0.26*** 0.25*** 
 [6.75] [3.11] [4.26] [4.94] [6.41] [7.74] [7.67] [7.28] [5.69] [4.63] 
Ethnicity 0.053 0.30 0.23 0.082 0.018 0.015 0.033 −0.077 −0.16* −0.080 
 [0.57] [1.33] [1.48] [0.70] [0.18] [0.18] [0.41] [−0.97] [−1.77] [−0.77] 
Family size 0.14*** 0.11*** 0.13*** 0.15*** 0.15*** 0.15*** 0.15*** 0.16*** 0.16*** 0.14*** 
 [11.0] [4.00] [6.98] [10.5] [13.2] [14.7] [15.5] [16.4] [14.7] [10.8] 
Hukou −0.44*** −0.65*** −0.52*** −0.45*** −0.36*** −0.35*** −0.31*** −0.29*** −0.31*** −0.30*** 
 [−9.36] [−6.17] [−7.28] [−8.23] [−8.04] [−9.07] [−8.39] [−7.76] [−7.45] [−6.17] 
Rural −0.26*** −0.36*** −0.35*** −0.32*** −0.28*** −0.24*** −0.20*** −0.18*** −0.17*** −0.14*** 
 [−6.19] [−3.70] [−5.29] [−6.19] [−6.63] [−6.70] [−5.77] [−5.29] [−4.45] [−3.05] 
Number of houses 0.25*** 0.25*** 0.23*** 0.21*** 0.19*** 0.20*** 0.20*** 0.22*** 0.26*** 0.33*** 
 [7.59] [3.21] [4.32] [5.09] [5.68] [6.99] [7.28] [7.96] [8.35] [9.14] 
Children −0.19* −0.24 −0.027 −0.15 −0.20* −0.24** −0.28*** −0.35*** −0.31*** −0.25** 
 [−1.79] [−0.93] [−0.15] [−1.14] [−1.78] [−2.47] [−3.04] [−3.82] [−3.03] [−2.07] 
Old −0.15** −0.42*** −0.23** −0.19** −0.097 −0.075 −0.068 −0.033 0.076 0.075 
 [−2.34] [−2.69] [−2.19] [−2.33] [−1.45] [−1.31] [−1.22] [−0.60] [1.23] [1.05] 
Employed 0.56*** 0.62*** 0.70*** 0.51*** 0.50*** 0.48*** 0.40*** 0.40*** 0.45*** 0.45*** 
 [9.55] [4.60] [7.58] [7.34] [8.66] [9.65] [8.33] [8.45] [8.57] [7.31] 
Agriculture 0.17*** 0.53*** 0.099 0.041 −0.030 −0.015 −0.027 −0.031 −0.053 −0.047 
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 Dependent variable: household income (log) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
 
OLS Q_10 Q_20 Q_30 Q_40 Q_50 Q_60 Q_70 Q_80 Q_90 
 [3.44] [5.07] [1.38] [0.74] [−0.66] [−0.39] [−0.72] [−0.84] [−1.28] [−0.98] 
Business 0.33*** 0.16 0.18** 0.21*** 0.22*** 0.22*** 0.31*** 0.33*** 0.37*** 0.49*** 
 [6.96] [1.48] [2.53] [3.86] [4.82] [5.72] [8.24] [8.96] [8.78] [10.2] 
Youth League −0.047 −0.55*** −0.080 −0.038 0.015 0.024 0.047 0.043 0.070 0.081 
 [−0.54] [−2.93] [−0.62] [−0.39] [0.19] [0.35] [0.70] [0.65] [0.95] [0.94] 
Communist Party 0.29*** 0.31*** 0.31*** 0.29*** 0.29*** 0.25*** 0.21*** 0.21*** 0.20*** 0.21*** 
 [7.79] [2.97] [4.41] [5.36] [6.49] [6.49] [5.63] [5.88] [4.82] [4.45] 
Non-Communist Party 0.14 0.12 0.0019 0.12 0.21 0.29 0.24 0.36* 0.26 0.11 
 [0.62] [0.21] [0.0047] [0.40] [0.86] [1.35] [1.18] [1.77] [1.12] [0.43] 
Junior high education 0.31*** 0.53*** 0.42*** 0.39*** 0.31*** 0.26*** 0.23*** 0.21*** 0.21*** 0.19*** 
 [8.60] [5.91] [6.83] [8.48] [8.18] [7.81] [7.16] [6.64] [6.06] [4.68] 
Senior high education 0.38*** 0.50*** 0.47*** 0.45*** 0.42*** 0.37*** 0.34*** 0.31*** 0.30*** 0.26*** 
 [8.23] [4.43] [6.07] [7.64] [8.66] [8.79] [8.39] [7.79] [6.78] [5.09] 
College education 0.80*** 1.17*** 0.81*** 0.73*** 0.65*** 0.62*** 0.62*** 0.58*** 0.61*** 0.69*** 
 [13.8] [7.74] [7.77] [9.27] [10.1] [11.0] [11.4] [10.9] [10.3] [9.91] 
Constant 9.20*** 7.74*** 8.37*** 9.13*** 9.37*** 9.55*** 9.76*** 10.1*** 10.3*** 10.4*** 
 [49.4] [16.9] [26.7] [38.3] [47.6] [56.1] [59.7] [62.4] [56.9] [49.5] 
Province fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 6,195 6,195 6,195 6,195 6,195 6,195 6,195 6,195 6,195 6,195 
R-squared 0.31 0.19 0.19 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.21 
Notes: Q_10 to Q_90 represent quantiles from 10 to 90. Numbers in square brackets are robust t-values. The table shows the results of OLS and QR using a binary variable 𝐹𝑖 
for financial inclusion. 𝐹𝑖 equals 1 if the household deprivation score is higher than 75 per cent and 0 otherwise. ***, ** and * represent significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% 
levels, respectively. 
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Table 5.7: Results from OLS and QR for the estimation of household income—
financial inclusion relationship (75 per cent cut-off) 
Matching method 
ATT (average treatment effect on the treated) 
Observed coefficient Standard error 
1. Nearest neighbour (one-to-one)  –0.402***  0.031 
4. Nearest neighbour –0.363*** 0.037 
Radius –0.350*** 0.035 
Kernel 0.358*** 0.035 
Local linear regression –0.356*** 0.045 
Baseline result 
OLS –0.332*** 0.029 
 
Table 5.8: Results from Machado and Mata’s (2005) method of counterfactual 
decomposition (75 per cent cut-off) 
 Q_10 Q_20 Q_30 Q_40 Q_50 Q_60 Q_70 Q_80 Q_90 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Effects of 
Characteristics 
0.34 0.43 0.45 0.48 0.52 0.51 0.50 0.59 0.61 
Effects of Coefficients 0.66 0.57 0.55 0.52 0.48 0.49 0.50 0.41 0.39 
Note: Q_10 to Q_90 represent quantiles from 10 to 90. 
Source: Author’s own calculations 
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Finally, it is important to test whether the systematic exclusion of the various 
components of Fi change the results in Table 5.2. To do so, this chapter re-estimates 
Table 5.2 using a variety of amended financial inclusion indicators that systematically 
exclude each component detailed in Table 4.1. In this case, because only three 
components at each time are employed, this chapter uses a 33 per cent cut-off, which 
adheres more closely to the MPI methodology in Alkire and Santos (2010). Table 5.9 
reports the results of this exercise, which are consistent with those found previously. 
Table 5.9: Regression analyses using re-estimated Fi with varying components 
Fi excluding: Transactions Savings Credit Insurance 
(1) OLS 
–0.30*** –0.29*** –0.29*** –0.35*** 
[–4.40] [–10.3] [–10.5] [–6.23] 
(2) Q_10 
–0.29 –0.43*** –0.43*** –0.40** 
[–1.33] [–5.99] [–5.83] [–2.19] 
(3) Q_20 
–0.39*** –0.37*** –0.39*** –0.40*** 
[–2.94] [–7.92] [–8.06] [–3.44] 
(4) Q_30 
–0.28*** –0.31*** –0.32*** –0.34*** 
[–2.90] [–9.54] [–9.79] [–4.24] 
(5) Q_40 
–0.32*** –0.28*** –0.29*** –0.34*** 
[–3.69] [–8.97] [–9.21] [–4.61] 
(6) Q_50 
–0.31*** –0.25*** –0.26*** –0.32*** 
[–4.12] [–9.49] [–9.60] [–5.08] 
(7) Q_60 
–0.27*** –0.21*** –0.22*** –0.30*** 
[–4.05] [–8.34] [–8.81] [–5.27] 
(8) Q_70 
–0.23*** –0.18*** –0.18*** –0.27*** 
[–3.58] [–7.06] [–7.34] [–4.90] 
(9) Q_80 
–0.20** –0.16*** –0.18*** –0.27*** 
[–2.47] [–6.19] [–6.77] [–4.13] 
(10) Q_90 
–0.22** –0.13*** –0.15*** –0.19** 
[–2.47] [–3.62] [–4.33] [–2.54] 
Notes: Q_10 to Q_90 represent quantiles from 10 to 90. Numbers in square brackets are robust t-values. 
The table shows the results of OLS and QR using re-estimated 𝐹𝑖 for financial inclusion. 𝐹𝑖 equals 1 if the 
household deprivation score is higher than 33.33 per cent and 0 otherwise. ***, ** and * represent 
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
5.5 Discussions 
Does financial inclusion improve people’s lives? Empirically, the findings from this 
chapter shed light on this question. Financial inclusion has a strong positive effect on 
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household income, and this effect can be found across all households with different 
levels of income. Given that income is a key determinant of household welfare, this 
suggests that financial inclusion improves household welfare and reduces poverty. This 
finding is consistent with Chibba (2009) and Park and Mercado Jr (2015), who found 
that financial inclusion is an effective strategy in reducing poverty. Further, this finding 
echoes studies that have found a positive role of microfinance (Ghalib et al., 2015; 
Zhang, 2017) and financial development (Jalilian & Kirkpatrick, 2005) in reducing 
poverty. 
The findings also show that low-income households benefit more from financial 
inclusion than their richer counterparts. This result is possibly because poor and 
vulnerable excluded households have fewer available coping strategies for income 
shocks. If this explanation is correct, then financial inclusion can not only increase 
resilience against shocks, but it could also potentially improve equity. This finding is 
consistent with Park and Mercado Jr (2015), who found that financial inclusion lowers 
income inequality, and it is consistent with studies that show a negative relationship 
between microfinance or financial development and income inequality (Beck et al., 
2007; Hamori & Hashiguchi, 2012; Imai & Azam, 2012). 
This chapter hypothesises that the underlying mechanism through which financial 
inclusion improves income is by: (1) improving access to transaction and saving 
accounts and payment facilities, which increases savings, empowers women and 
encourages investment and consumption (Ashraf et al., 2010; Dupas & Robinson, 2013); 
(2) improving access to credit, which positively affects consumption, employment 
status, income and health (Angelucci et al., 2013; Banerjee et al., 2015; Karlan et al., 
2016); and (3) improving access to insurance, which encourages riskier agricultural 
practice, while increasing income and children’s attendance at school (Cole et al., 2013; 
Karlan et al., 2014). While it is difficult to disentangle these effects, it appears that most 
of these explanations are consistent with the extant literature. 
5.6 Conclusion 
Using national representative household finance survey data from China, this chapter 
examines the effect of financial inclusion on household income. Taking into account a 
potential endogeneity problem, it makes several new findings. First, financial inclusion 
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has a strong positive effect on household income. This effect can be found across all 
households with different levels of income. Second, the QR approach shows that low-
income households benefit more from financial inclusion than richer ones. This chapter 
argues that, as a result, financial inclusion may help to reduce poverty and vulnerability 
and improve income inequality.  
The policy implication is clear: Policymakers and regulators should continue to promote 
financial inclusion to improve household welfare and reduce income inequality. For 
example, expanding the provision of financial services though government sponsored 
programs in rural and depressed urban areas can potentially improve household 
earnings.  
Similarly, government could accelerate efforts to facilitate the use of fintech 
technologies such as electronic currencies and e-banking amongst the excluded. The 
existence of widespread mobile coverage and access to smart phones suggests that an 
increasing number of excluded individuals could potentially access financial services 
electronically. Continued efforts to make ICT infrastructure effective, reliable and safe 
could, therefore, go a long way toward promoting financial inclusion. For this work 
successfully, government needs to carefully look at banking fee structures to ensure that 
they are fair and that they do not price-out a significantly high proportion of the poor. 
Introducing transparency requirements for the comparability of account fees and 
payment services can help key the banking system to stay fair and honest. 
Finally, financial literacy programs are useful in creating a demand-side approach to 
financial inclusion. Individuals can learn about transaction and savings accounts, 
interest rates and using e-banking technologies. 
The first wave of CHFS only provides cross-sectional data; thus, although this chapter 
attempts to control for endogeneity using PSM, it cannot completely rule out this 
problem. Future research should establish a clearer causal relationship between financial 
inclusion and household income. 
  
7
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Appendix 5.1 
Correlation of main variables 
 
Income (log) Financial inclusion Family size Age Hukou Rural Marriage Education Children Old Employment 
Income (log) 1.0 
          
Financial inclusion –0.234*** 1.0 
         
Family size 0.080*** 0.058*** 1.0 
        
Age –0.189*** 0.064*** –0.088*** 1.0 
       
Hukou –0.285*** 0.203*** 0.264*** 0.0 1.0 
      
Rural –0.265*** 0.194*** 0.206*** 0.145*** 0.581*** 1.0 
     
Marriage 0.116*** 0.0 0.293*** –0.0 0.071*** 0.065*** 1.0 
    
Education 0.403*** –0.203*** –0.152*** –0.353*** –0.519*** –0.425*** –0.0 1.0 
   
Children 0.039*** 0.0 0.407*** –0.328*** 0.092*** 0.033*** 0.137*** 0.0 1.0 
  
Old –0.168*** 0.0 –0.257*** 0.611*** –0.054*** 0.029*** –0.139*** –0.154*** –0.244*** 1.0 
 
Employed 0.082*** 0.082*** 0.0 –0.230*** 0.349*** 0.283*** 0.0 –0.048*** –0.134*** –0.324*** 1.0 
Notes: ***, ** and * represent significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Chapter 6: Conclusion 
6.1 Introduction 
This chapter highlights the main empirical findings emerging from this thesis, and the 
results are used to provide insights into the role of financial inclusion—particularly 
microfinance—in improving people’s lives. The chapter is organised as follows. Section 
6.2 highlights the main findings and outlines policy implications, and Section 6.3 
describes the contributions of this thesis. 
6.2 Main findings and policy implications 
This thesis investigates four research questions: (1) Does microfinance reduce poverty? 
(2) Does microfinance reduce gender inequality? (3) How does one develop a 
microeconomic-level index for financial inclusion? (4) Does financial inclusion increase 
household income? The findings of the thesis can be summarised as follows: 
1. Microfinance has a negative effect on poverty. 
2. Women’s participation in microfinance is associated with a reduction in gender 
inequality across countries. 
3. In China, the gender of the household head is unlikely to play a role in 
determining access to financial services. However, education, ethnicity and age 
are likely to play significant roles. 
4. Financial inclusion has a strong positive effect on household income and helps 
to reduce income inequality in China. 
As a result, the empirical findings of this thesis suggest the following policy 
prescriptions: 
1. National governments and international development agencies should continue 
to promote microfinance as a tool for reducing poverty. 
2. Governments and international organisations in developing countries should 
continue to promote microfinance to indirectly empower women. However, they 
should take into account that microfinance does not automatically empower 
women. Cultural and country-specific factors play a key role in determining how 
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microfinance interacts with gender inequality, and these factors should be 
considered when assessing the effect of microcredit in the developing world. 
3. In China, policymakers and regulators should continue to promote financial 
inclusion to improve household welfare and reduce income inequality. For 
example, expanding the provision of financial services though government 
sponsored programs in rural and depressed urban areas can potentially improve 
household earnings.  
4. Government could accelerate efforts to facilitate the use of fintech technologies 
such as electronic currencies and e-banking amongst the excluded. The existence 
of widespread mobile coverage and access to smart phones suggests that an 
increasing number of excluded individuals could potentially access financial 
services electronically. Continued efforts to make ICT infrastructure effective, 
reliable and safe could, therefore, go a long way toward promoting financial 
inclusion. For this work successfully, government needs to carefully look at 
banking fee structures to ensure that they are fair and that they do not price-out a 
significantly high proportion of the poor. Introducing transparency requirements 
for the comparability of account fees and payment services can help key the 
banking system to stay fair and honest. 
5. Financial literacy programs are useful in creating a demand-side approach to 
financial inclusion. Individuals can learn about transaction and savings accounts, 
interest rates and using e-banking technologies. 
6.3 Contributions 
The contributions of this thesis are fourfold. First, using a unique cross-country panel 
data set covering 73 countries between 1998 and 2008, Chapter 2 complements existing 
studies by finding that microfinance has a negative effect on poverty at the 
macroeconomic level. As a result of the unavailability of reliable macroeconomic-level 
data on microfinance, very few recent studies have investigated the effect of 
microfinance on poverty at the macroeconomic level. 
Second, Chapter 3 is the first empirical investigation to analyse the effect of 
microfinance on gender inequality. It uses a unique cross-country data set for 64 
developing economies from 2010 to 2014. It shows that women’s participation in 
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microfinance is significantly associated with a reduction in gender inequality, but that 
cultural factors are likely to influence this relationship. 
Third, using a national representative household finance survey data from China, 
Chapter 4 constructs the first microeconomic-level index for financial exclusion—
namely, the MFEI. This index reveals that the gender of the household head is unlikely 
to play a role in determining access to financial services. However, education, ethnicity 
and age play significant roles. Hitherto, the existing literature lacks a multidimensional 
index that brings together information on financial inclusion at the microeconomic 
level. 
Finally, using the MFEI discussed in Chapter 4, Chapter 5 is the first empirical study to 
investigate the effect of financial inclusion on household income at the microeconomic 
level. It finds that financial inclusion has a strong positive effect on household income, 
and this effect can be found across all households with different levels of income. 
Further, it finds that low-income households benefit more from financial inclusion than 
high- and mid-level income households. As a result, financial inclusion helps to reduce 
income inequality. 
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